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--Februar~, 1978 Conference 
List~ Sheet 2 
No. 77-983 r!. 5 X. 
WASHINGTON 
v. 
WASHINGTON STATE C0~1ERCIAL 
FbS3ENGER FI3E:TI~G VESSn:C.. ASS' N. 
Cert to vJ'ashington 
Supreme Ct from tNo 
decisions w/ various 
judges diss~~ting & 
. l/ concurrlng. 
State/Civil Timely 
l.. SUMMARY: Petrs Washington State, Washington State Department 
of Fisheries and the Director of that Department were enjoined by a 
!I 
The first is Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishinq VesseJ 
Ass•n v. Tollefson {hereinafter Tollefso~). Judge ~osellini wrote for 
the majority which included Hamilton, Bra~htenback and Hicks. Judges 
St;-,_fford and Wright concurred in the result only. Judge Utter dissentec 
The second case is Puget Sound Guill netters Ass' n v. Moos · (hereL1after 
Moos). Judge Rosellini again wrote for the majority which this time in-
cluded Judges Wright; Hamilton, Brachtenback and Armstrong. Judges 
Horowitz, Stafford and Utter concurred in part and dissented in pa~t. 
·:.· - 2 
~j federal DC from enacting any laws or regulations which interferred 
\ 
with the fishing rights of the Indians under certain treaties (Medicine . 
Creek Treaties). The Department, in an attempt to comply with the DC's 
order, then promulgated regulations which allowed the Indians to catch 
500/o of harvestable run of fish. The Washington Supreme Court struck 
down the regulations as being in excess of the Department's statutory 
authority and violative of the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution. Petrs raise a number of contentions., but they 
all seem to boil down to two questions: (1} whether the above _mentioned 
treaties require the ~tate to restrict fishing by non-Indians in order 
to provide a specified percentage of the fish to Indians; and (2) 
whether such a regulations would violate the equal protection clause. 
As explained below, I am not entirely sure that this case actually 
presents precisely thqse issues, but it is clear that the state and 
federal courts have interpreted the applicable treaty and the Constitutic 
of the United States in a conflicting manner. It is likewise possible 
those decisions place conflicting duties upon petrs. 
2. FACTS: In the mid-1850's, the United States entered into a 
series of treaties with Indians in the Northwest in .. which "the right 
of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed, grounds and stations, is 
further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the 
Territory." 10 Stat. 1132, Medicine Creek Treaty. These treaties have 
y 
been the subject of a great deal of litigation. Of particul~r concern 
Y This Court has addressed questions arising under the treaties a 
number of times. See, e.g., United States v. ' winans, 198 u.s. 371 (1905 : 
Tulee v. Washinaton, 315 U.S. 681 (1942}; Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Depart · 





( in this case is an action commenced iri 1970 by the United States against 
the State of Washington and its Department of Game and Fisheries to 
enforce compliance with the above mentioned treaties. The DC, in a 
lengthy opinion, ultimately enjoined the defendants in that action 
(petrs here) from enacting any laws or regulations which interfer)fed 
with the fishing rights of the Indians under the treaties. In particular 
the DC held that while the state could promulgate reascinable regulations 
for the purpose of conservation, the State could not regulate treaty 
Indians from taking the harvestable run at their 11 usual accustomed 
grounds and stations" unless necessary to limit them to 50"/o of the 
harvest on these grounds. United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 
( ...._ (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
\ 
423 u.s. 1086 (1976). Resps in the present action were not allowed to 
intervene, but, according to the DC and CA, filed extensive amicus 
briefs and participated almost as though they were parties at every 
stage of the proceedings. 
Petrs then promulgated regulations restricting the number of 
fish that could be taken by non-Indians in order to allow the Indians 
to take 50"/o of the fish. One of the resps, an association of charter 
boat operators, challenged in state court the regulations as they re-
\ 
\ 
duced the daily salmon limit for sports fishermen. The lower court 




~ ( \...._.., 
) 
']/ (Continued) : 
Puya'llup Tribe, Inc., 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup II) ; Puyallup Tribe, 
Inc. v. Department of Game, 45 U.S.L.W. 4837 (June 23, 1977) (Puyallup 
III). 
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~issed the case as moot because the season to which the regulations ? l' lU 
I ' 
applied was over. Upon rehearing, it decided it should address the 
questions because they were important and of a recurring nature. (See 
Tollefson case, fn. 1, supra). The court, with two judges dissenting, 
affirmed the lower court, ruling that the Director of the Department 
did not have the statutory authority to make an unequal allocation of 
fish among members of the same class of user. The basis for this 
ruling was the court's finding that the Director did not promulgate 
the regulations as a conservation measure, but rather in order to comply 
with the federal DC's order~d that such a regulation would violate 
------
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. The 
~' · dissenting judges argued that this Court had rejected the argument that 
\ 
the treaty violates the equal protection clause unless interpreted to 
confer no greater rights than those held by non-treaty citizens. See 
United States v. Winans, 198 u.s., at 379, 3817 Puyallup I, 391 U.S., at 
398, 402 n.l47 Puyallup II, 414 U.S., at 48-49. See also Antoine v. 
Washington, 420 u.s. - 194, 205-206 (1975). They also disagreed with the 
majority's interpretation of the Director's -powers. At about the same 
time, another one of the resps, a commercial fishing association, sought 
in state court a writ of mandamus requiring the Director to restrict 
fishing regulations to those necessary for conservation and to treat 
Indian and non-Indian fishermen equally. See Toos, fn. 1, supra. The 
( Washington Supreme Court ultimately held in favor of resp, ruling that 




conservation and could not treat Indians and non-Indians differently 
}/ 
because that result was not required under the treaties. The court 
thought the federal court action basically meaningless because not only 
had the federal court misinterpreted the treaty, but a federal court canr 
compel governmental officers to do what they are not authorized understa · 
law to do. Supervisors v. United States,~--· __ (lS ~~~-~- ] f (1873). 
Three judges concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing the writ 





duties, but disagreeing on the court's further holding regarding the scop , 
of the Director's powers. The United States and the Tribes did not seek 
party status in either of these cases, but filed amicus briefs. 
It is these two decisions from which petrs seek cert. Other facts 
will be given as relevant. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs ~~-~)to~~riefly on the merits o_f these 
decisions. They argue that to the extent the state court decision bars 
allocation of fishing rights to Indians, it is probably in conflict 
with 'the applicable decisions of this Court. In particular, they stress 
a conflict with Puyallup III (see fn. 2, supra), in which this Court 
'I 
essentially approved an allocation of fish to trea~ Indians. 
The thrust of petrs argument in favor bf cert, however, is not 
the wrongness of the decision below, but the fact that there is now a 
conflict between the state and federal courts on the matter and that 
v' the conflict particularly effects petrs, subjecting them to apparently 
(--. }/ The court initially decline-d to issue the writ because "the 
director will voluntarily abide by the court's decision." :Resps•renewed 
their request for a mandamus order, however, and petrs inform us that 
mandamus was issued on a preliminary basis by the Chief Justice of the 






conflicting duti~s. They point out that the federal DC repeatedly en-
J ' 
( joined the state court from deciding the matter, but these injunctions 
l were simply ignored. They also inform us that the Director has been 
ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court 
in both state and fed~ral . court. And yet, stresses the . Director, it 
is impossible to comply with both the decisions. 
/ A response has been filed by the commercial fishing association. 
It too . thinks this Court ought to grant cert to resolve this conflict. 
The association particularly stresses the fact that this involves the 
construction of a treaty and the federal constitution, so it involves 
· particularly important questions of federal law. It also stresses the 
violence engendered by the dispute between the Indians and non-Indians. 
4. DISCUSSION: The conflict in this case is clear and the 
• 
Director appears to be . caught between the federal and state courts, 
but I am not entirely sure whether the problem can be resolved through 
review of this case. 
It is clear the state and federal court disagree on the proper 
interpretation of the treaty. The state court held that the treaty 
granted the Indians simply an "equal opportunity to fish." The federal 
-court held in essence that the Indians were entitled to 5~/o of the 
harvestable fish in their usual fishing places. Moreover~ the state 
court held that granting the Indians 5~/o of the fish would violate the 
( equal protection clause. In light of the cases cited in fn. 2, supra, '-.....-





( court is wrong on both counts. The problem, however, is that the very 
first holding in each of the state court cases appears to be that the 
Director does not have the power to issue regulations for any purpose 
other than conservation (and since the regulations were issued for the 
purpose of complying with a federal court order and not for the purpose 
of conservation, they were beyond the scope of the Director's authority). 
One still might argue that that presents a question of federal law 
because it directly involves compliance with a federal court order. I 
am not so sure, however. It seems to me that both petrs and the 
Washington Suprem~ court simply misconceive the federal court order. 
As I read it, the DC did not order the state to promulgate regulations 
( limiting the catch of non-Indians to 5~/o. Rather, it held that the 
state could not issue regulations which violated the Indians' treaty 
rights (e.g., the state could issue conservation regulations as long 
as they allowed the Indians at least _ 5~/o of the catchl. Once the DC 
decree is formulated in those terms, it does not place the Director 
f I 
under conflicting obligations, at leaslJ~nder the conflicting obligationE 
the Director claims to be under. Rather, if, under state law, the 
Director cannot issue regulations which conform to the DC order, then 
the Director simply cannot issue any regulations which limit the 
Indians' rights. Then, I would think, if non-Indians take more than 
5~/o of the fish, the United States government, as trustees for the 
Indians, or the Indians themselves can go into federal court and enjoin 
t~e guilty parties (the federal DC has continuing jurisdiction over 
( ""· 




the matter). Thus, the bind in which the Director/i~placed may be 
more illusory than real and the threshold question in this case may 
really be one largely of state law. 
I think there is enough doubt about the matter, however, that the 
court ought to call for the views of the S.G • . The federal government 
plays an important role with respect to these Indians and these treaties. 
The government also understands the exact scope of the DC's decision 
and can giye us a much better idea of the exact nature ·of the conflict, 
the Director's supposedly conflicting duties, and the questions really 
presented for · review in this case. And if, contrary to my initial 
impression, the case really presents for review those questions which 
petrs and resps claim are presented, then I think the case may well 
be certworthy. 
There is one response. 
2/13/78 
CMS 
Young Wash. S. Ct. ops in 
petn. 
( 
No. 77-983 CSX 
WASHINGTON v.WASHINGTON STATE COMMERCIAL PASSENGER FISHING VESSEL ASS'N. 
The SG has filed an amicus brief. It supplements the factual 
statement in this memo by noting that, as the state court litigation 
gradually indicated that Washington would not be able to comply with the 
federal court's judgment, the United States and the tribes again 
invoked the continuing jurisdiction of the district court in 
United St&tes v. Washington. That court issued a series of 
~orders during August and September, 1977, designed to protect the 
Indians' treaty rights. By orders dated August 10 and 31, 1977, 
the federal court determined the treaty Indians' proper share 
of th~977 harvest and expressly removed that share from 
the jurisdiction and control of the State of Washington. 
The federal court also issued injunctions against the non-
,. treaty fishermen, prohibiting all net salmon fishing in certain 
specifically described geographic areas except during such times 
j and in such specific waters as were open by regulations conforming to the 
court's prior orders. 
/ The SG urges that the petn for cert be denied or that action on 
it be deferred. Although the SG believes that the de.cisions by the 
state courts on which petrs seek cert are incorrect as a matter of federal 
law, he also believes that these cases do not provide an adequate or appro-
priate vehicle for resolution of the important conflict that exists between 
the federal and state courts. The cases awaiting eecision by the 
federal court of appeals can be expected to provide a much more 
suitable vehicle, and review of the controver_¥y by this 
Court should await their presentation. 
The. SG particmlarly emphasizes the incompleteness of the 
record below. He argues that the reccrd in the federal cases pending 
before CA 9 on the same issues will be much more complete and 
review of those cases would, by any measure, be preferable to granting cert 
( 
- 2 -
in this case. 
Finally, the SG questions whether there is presently any 
final judgment in Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos 
from which the State of Washington can seek review. Despite its 
agreement with most of resps' arguments, the Wash. Sup. Ct. 
declined-' to issue a writ of mandamus against the State or its 
officials. Moreover, the proceeding has now been reopened by 
the filing of an emergency motion by reaps. In the SG's view, 
~ this Court thus lacks jurisdiction over that case while it is still 
pending in the state court. Although a further order of the state court 
might remedy the defect, for this Court to grant cert now would 
be at least premature. 
j My own view is that cert should be denied. This Court 
l can veview the federal court judgmen t,now pending befoE£ CA 9, 




No. 77-983 CSX 
WASHINGTON v. WASHINGTON STATE COMMERCIAL PASSENGER FISHING 
VESSEL ASS'N. 
Resps' Reply to SG's Amicus Brief has been received. It 
makes several contentions. 
1. Resps take issue with the SG's assertion that the 
case pending before CA. 9 will provide a more suitable 
vehicle for resolution of the issues presented in this 
petn. Resps claim . that at the time of oral argument 
in CA 9, the 'presiding judge" of the panel stated that 
the court would no:t review the in t e r p:::e 1Ca tion "of the "in common 
with" language in tre treaty provision--the inte!."'preta~ion 
of which, petrs claim, is of vital importance. 
I do not find this argument to be very strong. 
The interpretation of the "in common with" provision 
is not the paramount · issue that resps would have us believe. In any 
e·vent, -~ - I think the Court should not put too much stock 
in resps' prognosis as to what CA 9 will or will not decide when 
it issues its opinion. 
2. The SG has argued that the record is incomplete in the 
state cases. Although resps claim that the issues to be 
decided are issues of law not requiring a complete record, 
resps state that they and petr are willing to permit the United 
States to include with the record before this Court all or 
(~ any part of the record in United States v. Washington. 
.. . , .. 
- 2 -
3. The SG objects that the United States and the 
Indian Tribes are not parties to-·the state cases. Resps 
contend that the U.S. and the Tribes were invited by the 
parties and the State Supreme Court to participate as 
intervenors in those cases, and they refused. On the other 
hand, two of the resps in the state cases petitioned to 
intervene in the federal case but their petitions were denied. 
I see no particular relevance to resps' discussion 
on this point. 
· 4. The SG questions whether there is presently any 
final judgment in Phget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos 
(the state case) from which the state of Washington can 
seek review. Resps submit that the decision below became 
final on October 10, 1977, when the Washington Supreme 
Court denied a petn for rehearing in that case. Resps 
argue that their Oct. 7, 1977, emergency motion to which 
the SG refers was a motion for purely remedial relief. It in 
no way affects the finality of the decision of the state Supreme 
Court. 
This disagreement is ·d~ffi~ult to appraise without 
access to the emergency motion. However, I am inclined 
to credit the SG's interpretation of the finality question 
1 ~ over that of the resps. The fact that resps have sought 
only "remedial" relief (as opposed, I guess, to prospective 
relief) in their emergency motion seems largely immaterial 
... + l t 
- 3 -
( to the finality question. If further relief may be 




would seem to be non-final. 
5. La :st: l-.y ,..--- r~ ~-P.S.r state that, although they feel that 
the state cas~ before this Court are an adequate vehicle 
to review the major issues in United States v. Washington, 
particularly since the record in that case can be brought 
before this Court, resps are willing to have the cases 
~esently pending before CA 9 consolidated with the 
state cases before this Court for review of all the issues 
raised by all these cases. 
Because the two cases are so closely inter t wined, 
~ it mig~c be useful to hold this case until CA 9e s ~ 
decision is issued and cert is sought on that case. 
I am still of the view, however, that the federal case is 
the better vehicle for review of the issues here presented 
and resps offer no persuasive reasons why the cases would have to 
be consolidated. 
3/1/78 Ellis on Opinion in petn 
,... ...... .. 
( No. 77-983 CSX, WASHINGTON v. WASHINGTON STATE COMMERCIAL 
PASSENGER FISHING VESSEL ASSN. 
rhis case was held for CA 9's decision in 
a related proceeding. CA 9's opinion and judgment 
having been received, the case is on the relist list 
for May 18, 1978. 
CA 9 affirmed the decision of the DC. It is now 
I 
clear that the federal DC has, for all practical purposes, 
~
taken over management of fishing rights in the state of 
...... 'WI'~ ~--- ... .__ ....-------
Washington. ·Tt is also clear that the state court decision 
----""" 
(from which cert is being sought in No. 77-983) conflicts 
with the decision o~ the federal DC and the CA 9 as to 
( 
J the proper interpretation of the treaty. Still, I do not think this case merits a grant. 
As e~plained in the preliminary memorandum, at p. 7, 
petrs and the Washington Supreme Court misconceive the 
federal court order (now affirmed by CA 9). The DC did 
not order the state to promulgate regulations limiting the 
catch of non-Indians to 50%. Rather, it held only that the 
state could not issue regulations which violated the Indians' 
treaty rights. Under this view of the DC's order, it does 
not place the Director of the Dept. of Fisheries under 
a conflicting set of obligations. If the Director cannot, 
( under state law, issue regulations which conform to the DC 
order, then the Director simply cannot issue any regulations 
- 2 -
( 
that limit the Indians' rights. But, in any event, 
the resolution of this question obviously-turns on 
Washington law, not federal law. 
The significant federal law question--i.e., the 
proper interpretation of the treaty--i ~ -presented in the 
case just decided by CA 9. If the Court wants to consider 
i 
J 
the question, it will have a chance when cert is sought--
as I am sure it will be--from CA 9's decision. 
In the interim, however, there is no need to hold this 
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*PUYALLUP RESERVATION BOUNDARIES AS 
ESTABLISHED THROUGH 1874. PRESENT LEGAL 
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CA 9 (Goodwin, 
and Kennedy) 
Timely 
Cert. to W.O. Washington 
( Bo 1 d t , D • J • ) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. Summary: These two petitions arise from the 
continuing controversy over the proper construction and 
effective implementation of the fishing rights clauses ,..., ..... ..,.-, .-
contained in the treaties between the United States and the 
Pacific Northwest Indian tribes. 
2. Facts: (a) Procedural Posture in this Court. In 
No. 78-119, the State of Washington seeks review of two 
decisions of the CA 9, Washington v. United States, 573 F.2d 
1118 (April 24, 1978)("International Fishery casi), and Puget 
Sound Gillnetters Assn v. USDC for the WD Washington, 573 F.2d 
1123 (April 24, 1978)("Washington Fishery case"). In No. 78-
139, Puget Sound Gillnetters Association and other commercial 
fishers associations seek review of the Washington Fishery 
case. They also seek direct review of the decision in United 
States v. Washington, Civ.No. 9213 (W.D.Wash. June 6, 
2. 
1978)("1978 Enforcement Order"). The United States has filed a 
single Brief in response to the two petitions. 
The petitions in Nos. 78-119 and 78-139 are curve-
lined. The two petitions are in turn straight-lined with 
~~/,~ . ~~~J Washington v. Washinqton State Comm'l Passenger Fishinq Vessel 
a#~~d. 
Assoc., No. 77-983, and this Memorandum assumes familiarity 
with the facts stated in the Preliminary Memorandum in that 
~~1case. The extensive Preliminary Memorandum in 
~~~ 
1 
Washington, No. 75-588, cert. denied, 423 u.s. 
(1976)("Treaty Case"), is also helpful. 
United States v. 
1086 
(b) Facts in Washington Fishery Case. In response to 
the Washington state court litigation at issue in No. 77-983, 
the United States and the tribes invoked the continuing 
jurisdiction of the DC in the Treaty Case. The DC determined 
the Indians share of the 1977 harvest and removed that share 
from State jurisdiction. When it appeared that State law 
prevented the State's Department of Fisheries from enforcing 
the resulting limit on non-treaty fishermen, the DC issued 
injunctions against the non-treaty fishermen. The injunctions 
prohibited all net salmon fishing in specified geographic areas 
except during such times and in such places as are authorized 
by regulations conforming to the DC's basic allocation of the 
harvest between treaty and non-treaty fishermen. The DC 
directed the State and the United States to cite any fisherman 
who, having notice of the injunction, thereafter fished 
3. 
illegally, and to require him to appear before the DC to show 
why he should not be held in contempt. 
Both the non-treaty fishermen and the State sought 
review of the DC's orders. The CA 9 consolidated the appeals, 
and upheld the orders entered by the DC, in the Washington 
Fishery case. 
(c) Facts in the 1978 Enforcement Order. In June 
1978 the DC issued an order to govern fishing rights during the 
1978 and subsequent fishing seasons. According to the SG, that 
order is in all material respects identical to the 1977 order 
at issue in the Washington Fishery case. A notice of appeal 
from the 1978 Enforcement Order has been filed and the matter 
is pending in the CA 9. 
(d) Facts in the International Fishery Case. In the 
Treaty Case, the State argued that the Convention of May 26, 
1930, between the United States and Canada abolished Indian 
treaty fishing rights with respect to Fraser River salmon. The 
Convention provides for an equal division of the catch of 
Fraser River salmon between Canadian and American fishermen and 
establishes the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Comm'n 
(IPSFC) to implement the agreement. The IPSFC proposes 
regulations each year to govern fishing in the Fraser River, 
effective on approval of each nation. 
The United States argued that the Convention was not 
intended to affect the allocation of United States fishing 
4. 
rights between Indians and non-treaty fishermen. The CA 9 
agreed, but also concluded that all fishermen were bound by 
IPSFC regulations. When the United States was unsuccessful in 
securing alteration of the IPSFC regulations to allow a special 
treaty fishery, it withdrew its approval of a portion of the 
1975 regulations of the IPFSC. The DC then ordered the State, 
which had incorporated the IPSFC regulations into its own laws, 
to alter its regulations to permit a special treaty fishery on 
the Fraser River. 
The State appealed, and the CA 9 dismissed the case as 
moot in the International Fishery decision. 
3. Decisions Below: (a) Washinqton Fishery Case. 
The CA 9 began by reaffirming the construction given by it and 
the DC to the fishing rights clause in the Treaty Case. There 
the treaty provision securing to the Indians "[t]he right of 
taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations 
••• in common with all citizens of the Territory" was 
interpreted to interdict State regulation of Indian fishing 
that would reduce the Indians' take below fifty percent of the 
annual harvest. The only exception is State conservation 
regulations essential to the preservation of a particular run. 
The CA 9 held that the different treatment of Indians 
and non-Indians in the DC order is not an Equal Protection 
violation. In reaching its conclusion on this point, the CA 9 
pointed to the quasi-sovereign status of the Indians under 
5. 
their treaties with the United States, reasoning that the 
distinction drawn is a political and not a racial one. 
The CA 9, noting the inability of the State to 
regulate the fisheries in a manner assuring the Indians their 
treaty rights, approved the 1977 regulation of the fisheries by 
the DC. It found that the DC regulations aimed at providing 
non-treaty fishermen with 55 percent of the total opportunity 
at the available harvest, and treaty fishermen 45 percent, and 
that this allocation was consistent with the treaties. It 
found the DC's regulations reasonably suited to assure that the 
Indians' share of the harvest would make it past the non-treaty 
fishermen and up the runs to the treaty fisheries. 
The CA 9 upheld the DC's orders that were directed at 
fishermen and fishing associations not parties to the 
Washington Fishery case. It reasoned that in litigation over 
the allocation of a natural resource held by the State in trust 
for its people, citizens of the State are in privity with the 
State. Fishing rights are State-created, and any right of 
private appropriation is derivative from State power and 
control. As authority, the CA 9 cited water law cases in which 
States litigate their rights to water, and appropriators under 
the States' laws are bound by those decisions without being 
parties. 
Judge Kennedy, concurring, recognized that the Treaty 
Case made the "even apportionment" construction of the fishinq 
6. 
rights clause manadatory for the panel in the Washington 
Fishery case. But he also stated that "it has not been clearly 
demonstrated that the rule of fifty percent apportionment is a 
necessary and proper implementation of those treaty rights." 
Judge Wallace joined Judge Kennedy's concurrence. 
(b) The 1978 Enforcement Order. The 1978 Enforcement 
Order continues the DC's regulation of the fisheries. Review 
is sought prior to CA 9 review. 
(c) International Fishery Case. The CA 9 dismissed 
this case as moot. The 1975 IPSFC regulations, the subject of 
the DC's order to the State, had been superseded by the time 
the CA 9 decided the appeal. Further, the United States has 
removed treaty fishermen from IPSFC jurisdiction and now 
regulates treaty fishing itself. Therefore, the CA 9 
concluded, there is little chance that the challenged orders of 
the DC will be repeated. 
4. Contentions: The State argues that the CA 9's 
basic construction of the fishing rights clause, in the 
Washington Fishery case, to require a fifty-fifty allocation is 
erroneous, especially where the fishery is open and available 
to all fishermen. The State relies on the decision in 
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44 
(1973), to indicate this Court's rejection of a specific 
allocation based on the treaty, though the Court there only 
indicated that it would not announce an allocation formula but 
7. 
would leave such a factual issue to the lower courts. The 
State stresses the misgivings of Judges Kennedy and Wallace, 
and emphasizes that because certiorari was denied in the Treaty 
Case, this Court has never passed on the merits of the treaty 
construction issue. 
The State contends that the CA 9 has reached 
conclusions about the construction of the treaty and about the 
equal protection question that are in conflict with the 
decisions of the Washington Supreme Court at issue in No. 77-
983. The State also contents that this Court's previous 
decisions have endorsed non-discriminatory regulation of 
fishing, directed at necessary conservation, as consistent with 
treaty rights, and that its regulation never went beyond 
conservation. 
Regarding the International Fishery case, the State 
argues that the decision is not moot because the United States 
is still pursuing the policy of allocating the Fraser River 
harvest on a 50-50 basis between treaty and non-treaty 
fishermen. 
In addition to the points made by the State, the petrs 
in No. 78-139 contend that the DC's orders in the Washinqton 
Fishery case and the 1978 Enforcement Order are significantly 
different from the orders at issue in the earlier Treaty Case. 
While the earlier order restrained the State from interfering 
with the opportunity of treaty fishermen to take up to 50 
8. 
9. 
percent of the annual harvest, the present order runs against 
individual fishermen and sets numerical limits on the catch 
allowed to non-treaty fishermen. 
These petrs stress the ruinous consequences of the DC 
order for their commercial fishing industry. They argue as 
well that the DC, by ordering the State Department of Fisheries 
to aid in enforcement of the DC's orders, has ignored the State 
Supreme Court's ruling thas the Department has no authority to 
engage in such activity. 
Regarding the Enforcement Order of 1978, these petrs 
contend that no meaningful review is likely in the CA 9 because 
the 1978 Order is virtually the same as the 1977 order already 
reviewed in the Washington Fishery case. They urge the Court 
to settle this question of treaty rights expeditiously by 
accepting a direct appeal. 
The SG does not oppose a grant of certiorari in the 
Washington Fishery case and the 1978 Enforcement Order, but 
does maintain that the International Fishery case is moot. The 
SG states that the conflicting decisio~s of the CA 9 and the 
Washington Supreme Court on both the treaty construction and 
the enforcement issues have caused a serious breakdown in the 
-------------~ 
enforcement of fisheries regulations in Washington. The SG 
contends that only resolution of the conflict by this Court 
will allow a return of control of the fisheries to the State 
and ensure State enforcement of the treaty rights of the 
Indians, relieving the federal government of the substantial 
enforcement burden it bears currently. 
The SG identifies the central issue in the Washinqton -----Fishery case and the 1978 Enforcement Order as the 
interpretation of the fishing rights clause. He agrees with ----- _.-.--........ ----- ,_ ~ 
petrs that the conflict between the CA 9 and the Washington 
Supreme Court is substantial, and does not think that this 
Court's denial of certiorari in the Treaty Case forecloses the 
issue at the present time. The SG concludes that the Court 
should review both the Washinqton Fishery case and the 
Washington Supreme Court decisions in No. 77-983 on the treaty 
interpretation issue. The SG also urges the Court to resolve 
this litigation once and for all by also reviewing the DC's 
enforcement orders. 
Respondent Yakima Nation urges the Court to deny ______....__ 
certiorari. A grant, in this resp's view, will only strengthen 
the State's resistance to the DC's orders and thus provoke 
continued lawlessness in the fisheries. The resp urges a 
denial of the petitions accompanied by an opinion disapproving 
the State's position--a kind of summary affirmance of the CA 9 
decision. 
Other Indians tribes, as respondents, urge that the 
State cases in No. 77-983 are contrived. They also argue that 
the treaty interpretation question was decided in the !reaty 
Case, and should not be relitigated now. Further, they contend 
10. 
that because the DC has now taken over the enforcement burden 
itself, removing jurisdiction over the fisheries from the 
State, the State cases are moot. Finally, they point out that 
review by this Court cannot cure the enforc~ment problems 
created by the state law incapacity of the Washinton Department 
of Fisheries to enforce any rules other than conservation 
measures. 
5. Discussion: The misgivings of Judges Kennedy and 
Wallace about the justification for the "even apportionment" 
interpretation of the fishing rights clause argue in favor of 
reviewing that question. Now that the treaty interpretation 
first announced in the Treaty Case has been particularized 
fully in the DC's regulations, the issue is ripe for review. 
I 
Because all of the parties agree that the 1977 and 
1978 DC regulations differ only in some details, there seems 
be no reason to grant the petn for review of the 1978 
Enforcement Order before a decision by the CA 9 in that case. 
to 
The CA 9 will be able to apply a decision by this Court in the 
Washington Fishery case to the appeal of the 1978 Enforcement 
Order. 
The basis for the SG's optimism about the effect of a 
decision by this Court on the willingness of the State to 
enforce the Indians' treaty rights is unclear. If no state 
officer is authorized by State law to undertake such duties, 
that incapacity will not be removed by this Court's holding on 
1 1 • 
federal treaty and constitutional issues. 
Even if there is little likelihood that the State will 
assume the burden of enforcing the Indians' treaty rights, 
however, review of the state court decisions in No. 77-983 in 
conjunction with the Washington Fishery case still may be 
important. The Washington Supreme Court held not only that the 
State Department of Fisheries has no legal authority to enforce 
other than conservation regulations, but also that the 
Department has a statutory duty "to authorize the harvesting of 
salmon not required for spawning" and that it "may restrict the 
harvesting of salmon by the commercial fishermen only to the 
extent that no surplus exists and that the restriction is 
necessary to prevent the impairment of the supply of salmon". 
The Washington court held that the Department may not "allocate 
fish among competing claimants for purposes other than 
conservation," and may not "allocate fish to treaty Indians or 
to non-Indians." Any action by the Department that is 
consistent with this declaration of duty will be inconsistent 
with the interpretation of the fishing rights clause in the 
Treaty Case and the Washington Fishery case. But the 
Washington Supreme Court interpreted the fishing rights clause 
differently from the federal courts, holding that it only 
requires equal opportunity in the fisheries for all fishermen. 
As a consequence, State officials are under a state statutory 
duty to regulate in a manner inconsistent with federal law as 
12. 
• 
declared by the federal courts but consistent with federal law 
as declared by the Washington courts. 
When the Washington Supreme Court reached its 
decisions in the cases in No. 77-983, it d~..:clined to issue 
mandamus to the Department of Fisheries because of its 
confidence that the Department would follow its directions. 
Subsequently, a state superior court ordered the Department of 
Fisheries to issue regulations inconsistent with the DC 
regulations upheld in the Washington Fishery case, and the DC 
enjoined the state superior court from enforcing its order 
against the Department of Fisheries. See Washington Fishery 
case, petn in No. 78-119, at A-20 to A-21. This episode 
exemplifies the possibility of continuing disputes between the 
.............. ,....-.,~ ...-. ~~ 
state and federal courts until the disagreement over the 
requirements of the fishing rights clause and the Equal 
Protection clause is settled. 
I as moot. 
The International Fishery case was dismissed properly 
There are several responses to each of the two 
\ .: ·. , \ 
petitions. 
10/4/78 Boisture Opinion in petns 
13. 
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To: Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-119, Washington Fishery and International Fishery Cases 
The State has filed a Reply to the SG's Response to the petn. 
The State renews its argument that the International Fishery case 
is not moot. In support of this argument, it includes copies of 
two letters. Both concern Canadian protests against the United 
States' domestic regulation of Indian fisheries on the Fraser 
River. 
As I understand it, the DC ordered only that the State rescind 
a portion of the 1975 IPSFC regulations. It did not order the U.S. 
to undertake domestic regulation of the fisheries previously 
regulated by the IPSFC, nor did it approve such regulation. The 
I A continuing 
V \not affect -
dispute between the IPSFC and the U.S. State Dep't -does 
c.;;:-
the mootness of the International Fishery case. - .-""'\ 
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PUGET SOUND GILLNETTERS 
ASSN. 
v. 
USDC FOR WD WASH. 
Motion of Solicitor General to 
Consolidate. 




FACTS AND CONTENTIONS: On October 16, the Court granted cert in 
c.A 'f 
these three cases, consolidating the second two (state ~ cases) and 
Wash. S. C.:f-. 
setting them for argument (1 hr.) in tandem with the first (a federal 
case) • The SG moves for consolidation of all three cases for briefing 
and argument. 
- 2 -
1. The SG requests consolidated briefing because all the cases 
turn 
~on the nature and scope of the treaty fishing rights reserved by 
Indians of the Pacific Northwest, although there are certain differences 
between the issues raised. Judicial economy would best be served if 
each party was able to address this question in a single opening brief. 
Further, the cases raise issues concerning the proper division of 
authority between the state and federal judicial systems, which can 
be addressed most logically, efficiently, and clearly in single briefs. 
Consolidation would eliminate considerable duplication and cross-
referencing. Moreover, the SG believes that the parties to the state 
case are not true adversarie~ since the goal of both is to overturn 
.s-zo r..zd 6741 (91-f &r. / J7.7jJ
1 
c~,_r, 
the original decision in United States v. ~vashington _, c/.,..;7n:4', .Y..Z-3 c/.S. 
*I " /0$(1 {/97t;;.) . 
The Indian Tribes-and the fishing associations agree the cases 
should be consolidated. The Clerk has spoken with Wash. by telephone 
and it too agrees the cases should be consolidated. 
2. The SG suggests the following briefing schedule: 
Opening brief for Wash. 45 days from grant. 
Opening brief for non-Indian fishing 
associations 20 days from receipt of 
Wash.' s brief. 
Resp's briefs from U.S. and Indians 
30 days later. 
Reply briefs from Wash. and fishing 
associations as permitted by Rule 41(3). 
All parties concur in this schedule except Wash., which advised 
the Clerk it was mailing its own proposed schedule on October 31. 
(Apparently, Wash. believes the SG's schedule gives the U.S. too 
much time}. 
ctt */The Indians' motion was filed on behalf of all Tribes except 
the Yakima Indian Nation; there is no explanation for this exclusion. 
- 3 .,.. 
3. The SG also proposes that the two hours allotted for 
argument of these cases be divided as follows: 
30 minutes for Wash. 
30 minutes for fishing associations 
30 minutes for U.S. 
30 minutes for Indians 
This division recognizes the four distinct entities in these cases. 
The present division would give the parties opposing United States v. 
Washington 90 minutes to argue, and those supporting the decision only 
30 minutes. The Indians concur with this proposal. 
The fishing associations recognize that the present allocation 
of time may be "marginally disproportionate,"but think the SG's sugges-
tion goes too far in the other direction. They suggest the following: 
40 minutes for Wash. 
40 minutes for fishing associations 
40 minutes for United States and Indians 
This recognizes that the Indians and the United States, which sued 
as their trustee, have identical interests. On the other hand, the 
state and the associations differ on wheth~r the state has the author-
ity to enforce a preferential division of the catch in favor of the 
Indians. Furthermore, the state has no interest at all in whether 
the associations may be bound by the original federal proceeding~to 
which they were not parties)on a theory of privity with the state; 
in fact, the state consented ~o the issuance of federal orders running 
directly against the associations. 
Wash. is also submitting its views on an appropriate division 
of a:rgument time. 
- 4 -
DISCUSSION: 1. The consolidation of these cases seems 
*I 
desirable and is supported by all parties.-
2. The proposed briefing schedule is reasonable, and is 
supported by all except Wash. If Wash. 's submission has not been 
received before Conference, the Court might want to relist the motions 
for next week. (The Clerk advises this would not upset his schedule, 
although obviousl~ the sooner the parties know about consolidation, 
the better.) 
3. Neither of the suggested divisions of argument seem 
satisfactory. Essentially this is a dispute between the U.S. and Wash., 
the former representing the Indians and the latter its citizens. Thus, 
the bulk of the time should go to the ·main parties, with some time 
allowed for the Indians and the associations to present their special 
views or issues. This view is reflected in the following schedule: 
45 minutes for Wash. 
15 minutes for the associations 
45 minutes for the U.S. 
15 minutes for the Indians 
However, the Court might want to wait for Wash. ' s views. 




~If the Court does not consolidate, the SG alternatively 
requests 15 minutes to argue as amicus in the state case, with no 
additional time for the other side. The fishing associations agree 
with this request; Wash.'s views are not known. 
The Indians also move alternatively for 15 minutes to argue as 
amicus in the state cases, with no additional time for the other side. 
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PUGET SOUND GILLNETTERS 
ASSN. 
v. 
USDC FOR WD WASH. 
Response of Wash. to Motion of 
Solicitor General to Consolidate 
and Also to Motion of Certain 
Indian Tribes to Consolidate 
(Same) 
(Same} 
WASH.'S CONTENTIONS: 1. Wash. does not object to the proposed 
consolidation. However, it asks the Court not to require a single 
appendix for both sets of cases, because the designations have already 




consolidated would require service of additional designations on 
counsel not in both suits. This would delay preparation of the 
appendices, which must be filed by November 30. 
2. Wash. objects to the proposed division of argument on the 
same grounds as the fishing associations, and agrees with their 
counter proposal. Wash. stresses that their positions are adverse 
on the question of state power. 
3. Wash. objects that the proposed briefing schedule gives 
the government and the Indians 50 days to prepare their responses to 
the state's brief. Wash. suggests the following schedule: 
Wash.'s Brief November 30, 1978 
Association~ Brief December 14, 1978 
SG and Indians January 6, 1979 
This would give the U.S. and Indians 37 days to respond to the state's 
brief and 23 days to respond to the fishing associations' brief; and 
would allow adequate time for a reply brief, if the case is set for 
argument during the February 20-28 session. 
DISCUSSION: Under the SG's propos~d briefing schedule, the 
government's brief would be due January 19, leaving more than a month 
for a reply brief. The SG will probably need at least 50 days anyway, 
so there is no reason to cut down on its time. Nothing in the response 
-
changes my suggestion for division of argument (p. 4 of original memo). 
A single appendix would be more convenient for the Court. Wash. 's 
problem is illusory, because it can simply put its two separate append-
ices under one cover (with one index and numbered straight through), 
and eliminate any duplication of documents. If the Court agrees, it 
can instruct the Clerk to so advise the parties. 
11/8/78 Richman 
PJC 
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L7 U>.... ~ JZ(; c #fZJ ,. J t-~-· • .l... 1'17 7 tAT .. ..,c...l.c..,v... ~ 
~Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. U.S. District ~ ~~ 
(// Court, 78-139 Ji. c 1 q 7g-~ -~ 
~~ '0:t <=A~ 
In these cases the Court ~ s called upon to review the 
decisions of three different courts--the Ninth Circuit, the 
Western District of Washington, and the Washington Supreme 
Court--concerning a single, long-standing dispute over Indian 
fishing rights in the area of the Puget Sound. Three basic 
"-"' _.. 
questions are presented. First, is the correct interpretation ---of two treaties concerning fishing rights a question properly 
before the Court, even though the question was raised in prior 
proceedings in which the Court denied certiorari? Second, what 
is the correct interpretation of the fishing rights treaties? 
Third, what is the proper remedy for violations of the Indians' ________., 
rights under the treaties, and against whom may this remedy be 
directed? 
The dispute in this case centers around two mid-
nineteenth century treaties between the United States and the --
Indians, in which the Indians gave up substantial tracts of 
land in exchange for a promise that they would be allowed 
fishing rights off of their reservation "in common" with the 
citizens of what then was a territory. At the outset, the 
precise meaning of these words was not important, as there was 
an ample supply of fish for Indians and non-Indians alike. By 
the middle of this century, however, the supply had dwindled, 
and the question of apportioning in time of scarcity was raised 
for the first time. Thus, in 1970 the United States, acting on 
behalf of the Indians, brought suit in the Western District of 
Washington, asking the court to determine what the Indians' 
':.··' 
fishing rights were under the treaties, and whether Washington 
State fishing regulations were inconsistent with those rights, 
insofar as they liberally allowed non-Indians to fish in the 
Puget Sound area. 




which it found that "in common" as used in the treaties meant 
that neither Indians nor non-Indians could take so many fish as ~C 
~ 
to endanger the resource, ~d that each was entitled to a "fair l'i7f 
share" of the fish. The court concluded that the Indians were 
not allowed such a share under Washington regulations, as non-
Indians harvested most of the crop of Salmon and Trout before 
the fish reached the upstream locations where the Indians were 
~ 
allowed to fish. Accordingly, the court ordered State 
officials: (1) to stop regulating Indian fishing, save insofar 
as regulation was required to preserve the resource of the 
fishery; and (2) to enact regulations restricting non-Indian 
fishing to a certain . ~ercentage ~uqhly 50%h of the harvest. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court decision in 
,..- ~ - -._,. ~ 
virtually all respects in 1975, and in 1976 this Court denied 
certiorari. All the subsequent litigation, including each of 
the three cases now before the Court, grew out of the District 
Court's attempts to enforce the judgment it entered in 1974. 
From 1974 through 1976 various actions were filed in 
Washington courts in which injunctions were sought and obtained 
against State officials' complying with the federal district 
l t ~ 
court order. Finally, in 1977 the ~ashington Supreme Court 
ruled that State officials could not adopt regulations giving 
special concessions to Indian fishermen. The court based its 
decision on two theories. Fi~st, it said that such regulations 
were beyond the state officials' authority to promulgate as a 
matter of state law. Second, .it opined that giving a 
4. 
preference to Indians would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. This is the decision before the Court now as No. 77-
983. 
With the 1977 Washington Supreme Court ruling, 
compliance with the 1974 District Court order came to a halt. 
In response, the District Court in 1977 issued an enforcement 
order in which it did three things. First, it took upon itself 
the task of allocating the 1977 fishery among Indians and non-
Indians, reasoning that if this task was beyond the ken of 
Washington officials, it had to be handled by the federal 
courts. Second, the court enjoined State officials from 
permitting non-Indians to harvest fish over the limit the court 
set. Finally, the court issued an injunction directly against i}c 
the non-Indian fishermen, reasoning that, although the 
fishermen were not themselves parties to the federal 
proceedings, they were in privity with the State of Washington. 
Thus, the State had largely been representing their interests 
throughout the litigation, and the fishermen had .. ~ 
participated as amici at virtually every phase of the 
litigation. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. This _c~--~ _ _, .k 
Courtfrr--- . enforcement ruling is the second case now before the 
review, No. 78-119. ----
Finally, Xn 1978 the Federal District Court issued an ~ 
enforcement order similar to its 1977 order. Although this 
case has not been passed upon by the Ninth Circuit, it is 
before this Court on writ of certiorari in case No. 78-139. 
I~ 
1. ~the treaty interpretation before the Court? 
The SG urges the Court not to reconsider the District 
Court's 1974 interpretation of the treaty, noting that that 
decision was before the Court in 1976 and certiorari was 
denied. Indeed, the Government argues that the 1974 decision 
would have been final, but for the parties' blatant 
disobedience of the federal court orders. Thus, the SG 
suggests that it would be wasteful to review this decision at 
this date and, what is worse, review would encourage parties in 
future law suits to do their best to frustrate federal court 
orders in order to keep an issue alive. 
There is a great deal of appeal to the SG's position, 
seems to me that the non-Indian fishermen and the 
Washington courts have been remarkably intransigent throughout 
t QLs litigation. Nonetheless, I am reluctant to allow an issue 
of this magnitude and controversy to be resolved without some 
authoritative word from this Court. I fear, therefore, that 
the merits of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the 
treaties should be 
2. Treaty interpretation 
If the Court reaches the question of the 
interpretation of the provision for "common" fishing in the 
treaties, it will face a difficult question. On the one hand, 
it seems ridiculous that .027% of the population of Washington 
~-
should be entitled to 50% of the fish. On the other hand, at _____, 
the time the treaties were drafted the Indians in the region 
5. 
6. 
outnumbered the non-Indians and so, insofar was the parties to 
the treaty were concerned, it probably would not be remarkable 
that the Indians would get at least half of the fish. The real 
difficulty, of course, is that the parties to the treaty never 
considered the problem presented here. The Government, 
however, seems right in contending that the treaties must have 
meant something more than just that the Indians would be 
allowed to fish like everyone else--they had this right absent 
the treaty. If it is assumed that the treaties preserved some 
special rights of the Indians to fish, it is hard to draw a 
line short of the lower courts' 50%. 
3. Relief in this case 
The State and commercial fishing associations' weakest 
argument, it seems to me, is with the extraordinary remedies -
resorted to by the District Court. From the description in the 
Government's brief, it appears that the District Court has been 
taxed beyond all reasonable bounds, and that it has been forced 
to resort to draconian methods of protecting its jurisdiction; 
In sum, I think I would affirm the federal courts' 
rulings, and reverse the Washington Supreme Court ruling. I 
hasten to add, however, that I have spent only a few hours on 
the 26 briefs filed in this case, and so my attention has 
largely been devoted to figuring out the proceedings, rather 
than analyzing the law. 
2/27/79 David 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~tt;rrtttt.t QfLtttrlttf tfrt ~tb .§tatta-
'JiTMfrittghm. ~. Qf. 211?~2 
May 9, 1979 
/ 
Re: No. 77-983 Puget Sound/Washington State Fishing Case 
Dear John: 
My position with respect to your recently circulated memo-
randum in this case is very much that stated by Lewis in hiD 
note to you of May 9th. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
J' 
'· 









May 9, 1979 
77-983 Puqet Sound/Washington State Fishing Case 
Dear John: 
I have read with interest and admiration your 
memorandum. It is well written and persuasive. 
My vote at Conference was, however, the "other way" 
particularly with respect to the meaning of "right in 
common". I have not thought that this meant a 50/50 division 
between Indians and non-Indians. 
I am not disposed to write, but will await other 
circulations before coming to r.est. The really important 
thing is to settle this controversy. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
' . ,, ... 
·l .. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N 
.§up-rtntt <qottrl o-f tltt ~tti.Ub- ,®m.tcs 
~a:sJ:rhtg-tcn. tB. <q. 20g7)!.~' 
May ·ll, 1979 
Re: Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139 -Washington Fish cases 
Dear John: 
This indeed was a large task. I am prepared to join 
your memorandum if and when it is converted into an 
opinion, with the following reservations: 
l. I think I would prefer to affirm flatly the 
judgment in No. 78-119. This is the International 
Fisheries case, and the memorandum agrees with the CA9 that 
the case is moot. 
2. On page 35, there is an indication that the Court 
will not grant certiorari in the enforcement cases. I 
believe those cases are being held for this one and prefer 
not to prejudge them even though I agree that it is 
unlikely that certiorari in those cases will be granted. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 





.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~u:prt'lm <qattrl af flrt ~lt ~tait.s' 
'Jl'rurJrhtgtmt. ~. <!f. ZOb7Jl.~ 
May 14, 1979 
RE: Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 139 State of Washington v. 
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing, etc. 
Dear John: 
Your memorandum is a splendid job and r•d be happy 




Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.:§npr.em.t <!Jomi of flrt 'Jltnittb .:§tatt.tr 
:.rurltin:ghtn. ~. <ij. 20c?J!~ 
May 14, 1979 
., 7 '7 
Re.: 7S-983, 7-3-119, 78-139- Washington 
Fish Cases 
Dear Harry: 
Many thanks for your note. Both of your 
suggestions are good ones and will be adopted 
in our next draft--which will include quite a 
number of minor changes. 
Mr. Ju.stice Blackmun 
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~u.pumt <.qoud of tJrt ~ttittb ~btfts 
~asfrington. ~. <.q. 2.0,?>1-~ 
Memorandum 
To: Mr. Justice White ~ 
From: Michael E. Gehringer, Assistant 
Research Services 
May 31, 1979 
Librarian for 
Subject: Effect of Revised Statutes §5596 (1874) on 
the Act of June 30, 1834, c. 161, §1, 4 Stat. 
729 (1834) 
This memorandum is in response to your inquiry 
regarding the effect of Revised Statutes §5596 (1874) on 
the Act of June 30, 1834, c.l61, §1, 4 Stat. 729 (1834). 
Strict application of §5596, the consistent practice of 
this Court in regard to §1, and scholarly commentary on 
the definition of "Indian country," all concur that §1 was 
repealed by §5596. In practice, however, this Court relied 
on the provisions of the repealed §1 to determine the 
geographical limits to the application of the criminal 
sanctions of Revised Statutes §§2127-2157 (1874). This 
practice continued until 1948, when, with the revision of 
title 18 of the U.S. Code, a new statutory definition of 
"Indian country," (based on this Court's decisions construing 
§1) was adopted (18 u.s.c. §1151[1976]). 
A brief but thorough analysis of the history of the use 
of the §1 definition of "Indian country" can be found in 
Federal Indian Law 12-17 (1958). We have sent a copy for 
your use w1th this memorandum. 
JUDICIAL HISTORY 
This Court has consistently ruled that §1 was repealed 
by §5596 whenever it has been presented with that question. 
The principal cases in this area, many of which explicitly 
admit the repeal of §1 before going on to fashion judicial 
definitions and extensions for the term "Indian country" 
based on §1, are the following: 
- 2 -
Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) 
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) 
U.S. v. LeBr1s, 121 U.S. 278 (1887) 
U.S. v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909) 
Clairmont v. U.S. 225 U.S. 551 (1912) 
Donnelly v. U~ 228 U.S. 243 (1913) 
U.S. v. SandovaT 231 U.S. 28 (1913) 
U.S. v. Pelican 232 U.S. 442 (1914) 
u.s. v. Ramsey--· 211 u.s. 4 61 < 19 2 6) 
U.S. v. McGowan 302 U.S. 535 (1938) 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
4 Stat. 729, §l (1834) 
While several sections from this Act were ultimately 
codified as part of the Revised Statutes, §1 was not included 
in the revision. The definition in §1 had not been repealed 
or amended in any way prior to 1874, but doubts as to its 
continuing validity were apparent in the Commissioner's 
Draft codification of this section, and the accompanying 
notes (photocopies are attached). This proposed section 
was not part of the final revision and was never enacted. 
Revised Statutes §5596 (1874) 
This section was first introduced on the floor of the 
House on the final day of House proceedings on the Revised 
Statutes, April 1, 1874. A limited amount of floor discussion 
took place in the House, and later in the Senate, regarding 
the operation of this section. The discussion tended to 
restate the plain meaning of the effect and purpose of the 
section. (We have sent the proper volumes for your use.) 
An earlier version of a repealer section appeared as 
Title I, §3 of the Commissioner's Draft (photocopy attached). 
This Court's treatment of the effect of §5596 on omitted 
sections of otherwise included Acts has, again, been mainly 
consistent. One of this Court's earliest and clearest 
explications of the effect of §5596 in such situations can be 
found in u.s. v. Claflin, 97 u.s. 546, 548 (1878). As noted 
above, thrs-court has consistently applied §5596 as repealing 
§1 of the 1834 Act. In an analogous situation, this Court 
in Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 522 n. 23 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) dealt w1th a section of a 1793 navigation act 
- 3 -
that was never expressly repealed prior to 1873, had been 
part of the Commissioner's Draft, but never appeared in 
the Revised Statutes. That section was "deemed to have , 
been repealed, because of the omission" from the Revised 
Statutes. Id. The most recent comment by this Court on 
the effect-of §5596 on omitted statutory sections appears 
in your dissenting opinion in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 207 (1976). 
Attachments 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§uprmu <!}om1 ttf tfrt ~~ jifattg 
~l«lJri:ttgfttn. ~. (!}. 2U,?J.I..;l 
June 1, 1979 
/ 
Re: Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139 - Washington Fish cases 
Dear John: 
I am with you. I shall join an opinion prepared along the 
lines of your memorandum as recirculated May 31. 
Sincerely, 
/tHf 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
·' 
CHAMBERS 0~ 
.JUSTICE .J OHN PAUL STEVEN S 
~uprtnu> (!JMtrt d f!rt ~ittb ;§taUS' 
JfzurJringhm. ~. <q. 2l!~J!.~ 
June 1, 1979 
Re: 78-983, 78-119 and 78-139 - Washington 
v. Fishing Vessel Assn. 
Dear Potter: 
Thank you for your letter and kind words about 
my memorandum in this case. Your reference to "a 
basic 50-50 allocation of the available fish between 
Indians and non-Indians" prompts me to add a few 
more words, howeve~, to the already too many that I 
have written on the subject. 
First, I'm afraid that the memorandum may not make 
as clear as it should that the Indians would not be 
allocated 50% of the "available fish" in Washington. 
Instead they could take no more than 50% of those fish 
that pass through their traditional fishing areas, which, 
as I understand it, amounts to about 50% of half of the 
anadromous fish in the area. Second, the "p~that is 
being divided "between Indians and non-Indians" does J 
not include those fish that would later have passed 
through traditional fishing sites but instead are 
taken by non-Indian fishermen who are not citizens of 
Washington~ In short, even if the Indians' share were 
frozen at 50%, it would only amount to about 20% of the 
total number of fish in the area. Third, that number 
may drop still further when the District Court resolves 
the question of hatchery-bred fish which, if the 
Puyallup litigation is any guide, may be ·excluded from 
the "pie." In fact, that could result in the exclusion 
of up to half of the fish in some "runs," as it did in 
the Puyallup case. Fourth, the Indians' share is not 
- 2 -
frozen at 50%. As footnote 26 indicates, that is a 
ceiling, but not a floor, and the District Court has 
already dropped the Indrans' share below that point 
by 10% after its most recent assessment of the Indians' 
needs. Accordingly, even if the hatchery-bred fish 
are not excluded, the 20%-of-the-total estimate above 
is too high. Finally, I should point out that the 
modifications to the decree proposed in the memorandum 
significantly alter the manner in which the Indians'. 
share is to be calculated, so that they will not receive 
the benefit of the District Court's exclusion of 
reservation-taken, subsistence, and ceremonial fish. 
All. in all, therefore, the Indians will probab~y end 
up taking between 15 and '20% of the Washington anadro-
mous fish, which seems to me to be quite consistent 
with the treaty language and the intent of the parties 
to the treaty. 
I, of course, would be willing to emphasize these 
points more adequately than I have yet done if you 
think that would be helpful. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
j)uvrmtt Qfllltd cf tltt~ni:tt~ ~hdtg 
Jfa,glrhtgittlt, ~. Qf. 2!1~)~~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART June 1, 1979 
Re: 77-983, 78-119 and 78-139 - Washington v. 
Fishing Vessel Assn. 
Dear John: 
Please forgive my delay in responding to 
your admirably conscientious and thorough memo-
randum, for which we all owe you a debt of grati-
tude. As of now, I cannot bring myself to believe 
that the treaty la~guage implies a basic 50-50 
allocation of the available fish between Indians 
and non-Indians. I understand that Bill Rehnquist 
is preparing a short memorandum, and I shall wait 
to see what he says before finally co~ing to rest. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
: 
CH AM BERS 0~ 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL S TEVEN S 
~ttprtlttt <!fomt o-f tlft~b' j)hdtg 
J[¥J.ri:ttghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t~' 
June 1, 1979 
Re: 78-983, 78-119 and 78-139 - Washington 
v. Fishing Vessel Assn. 
Dear Potter: 
Thank you for your letter and kind words about 
my memorandum in this case. Your reference to "a 
basic 50-50 allocation of the available fish between 
Indians and non-Indians" prompts me to add a few 
more words, however, to the already too many that I 
have written on the subject. 
First, I'm afraid that the memorandum may not make 
as clear as it should that the Indians would not be 
allocated 50% of the "available fish" in Washington. 
Instead they could take no more than 50% of those fish 
that pass through their traditional fishing areas, which, 
as I understand it, amounts to about 50% of half of the 
anadromous fish in the area. Second, the "p1.e" that is 
being divided "between Indians and non-Indians" does 
not include those fish that would later have passed 
through traditional fishing sites but instead are 
taken by non-Indian fishermen who are not citizens of 
Washington. In short, even if the Indians' share were 
frozen at 50%, it would only amount to about 20% of the 
total number of fish in the area. Third, that number 
may drop still further when the District Court resolves 
the question of hatchery-bred fish which, if the 
Puyallup litigation is any guide, may be ·excluded from 
the "pie." In fact, that could result in the exclusion 
of up to half of the fish in some "runs," as it did in 
the Puyallup case. Fourth, the Indians' share is not 
- 2 -
frozen at 50%. As footnote 26 indicates, that is a 
ceiling, but not a floo~, and the District Court has 
alieady dropped the Ind~ans' share below that point 
by 10% after its most recent assessment of the Indians' 
needs. Accordingly, even if the hatchery-bred fish 
are not excluded, the 20%-of-the-total estimate above 
is too high. Finally, I should point out that the 
modifications to the decree proposed in the memorandum 
significantly alter the manner in which the Indians' 
share is to be calculated, so that they will not receive 
the benefit of the District Court's exclusion of 
reservation-taken, subsistence, and ceremonial fish. 
All . in all, therefore, the Indians will probably end 
up taking between 15 and '20% of the Washington anadro-
mous fish, which seems to me to be quite consistent 
with the treaty language and the intent of the parties 
to the treaty. 
I, of course, would be willing to emphasize these 
points more adequately than I have yet done if you 
think that would be helpful. 
Respectfully, 
Mr, Justice Stewart 






To: Justice Powell 
Re: Washington v. Washington State Ass'n, No. 77-983, et al. 
You have asked me to examine these three curve-lined 
cases and evaluate the prospect of writing a dissent. I have 
studied Mr. Justice Stevens' memorandum suggesting an opinion 
for the Court, have read the four major relevant cases, and have 
reread the major briefs. I have not as yet done any checking of 
the record, however, and would of course have to do some more 
research before actually drafting a proposed opinion. 
1. Justice Stevens' Opinion 
As you know, the basic issue in this case is whether a 
series of Indian treaties negotiated in 1854 and 1855 give to 
several Indian tribes in what is now the State of Washington the ~ / 
right to take a set proportion of the anadromous fisheries in 
that state. By their terms, these treaties reserved to the 
Indians the "right of taking fish at usual and accustomed 
grounds and stations ••. in common with all citizens of the 
Territory." The question, therefore, is simply what "right of 
taking fish •.• in common" meant as used in the treaties. 
As we have discussed, much of Justice Stevens' 
memorandum is thoroughly satisfactory. Thus, his description of 
2. 
the facts and prior proceedings (pp. 1-14) is excellent, and I 
have no quarrel with the treatment of remedies in Section VII 
(pp. 31-36). It is with Sections IV and V that we may 
disagree.~/ Section IV argues that "in common with" as used in 
the treaties must be read as guaranteeing more than a mere 
"right of access." Instead, Justice Stevens argues that the 
right of access was a means for securing the more important 
right to take fish. He concludes that because the shortage of 
fish has made access an insufficient protection for the Indians' 
right to take fish, the fisheries must be divided up, with some 
set percentage set aside for the Indians. Justice Stevens 
argues that the purpose and language of the treaties, as well as 
prior decisions of this Court, support his view that more than a 
mere right of access was reserved by the Indians in their 
treaties. 
Having concluded in Section IV that some percentage of 
Washington fisheries must be set aside for the Indians, Justice 
Stevens in Section V discusses what that percentage ought to be. 
He agrees with the lower courts' basic approach: because the 
Indians depended upon fish for their subsistence and were a 
*/ Section VI deals with the effect of the 1930 treaty between 
the United States and Canada concerning the Fraser River Salmon. 
I generally agree that this treaty should have little effect on 
the rights of the treaty Indians in this case, once the Court 




substantial portion of the population in the 1850's when the 
treaties were signed, he begins with a 50-50 split and then 
makes adjustments to take various factors into account. Thus, 
he would deduct from the Indians' share those fish taken by them 
on their reservations, where they have exclusive fishing rights, 
and those fish taken for ceremonial purposes. On the other 
hand, Justice Stevens would count against the non-Indian share 
all fish taken from identifiable fisheries by non-Indian 
Washington State residents fishing outside of the State's 
jurisdiction. The Indians' resulting percentage amounts to 
about 45%. 
In his memorandum to Justice Stewart of June 1, Justice 
Stevens has clarified his position somewhat concerning the 
allocation he proposes. First, he contends that the basic 50% 
allocation should pertain only to those fish which pass through 
the Indians' traditional fishing grounds, and therefore that the 
initial percentage probably is no more than 25% of all the 
available fish in Washington. Furthermore, he speculates that 
non-Washington fisheries and rulings concerning hatchery-bred 
fish will diminish the Indians' portion to between 15% and 20%. 
Finally, he notes that the allocation percentage is only a 
maximum, and therefore that insofar as the Indians do not need 
all of the fish they could take, they will not be entitled to 




a. History and Language 
The fundamental dispute in this case is whether the 
1854-1855 treaties secure to the Indians a right of access only, 
or go farther to guarantee them the option to take a certain 
proportion of the yearly catch. As all parties apparently 
concede, this was not a burning question at the time the 
treaties were negotiated, for neither the Indians nor the whites 
at that time anticipated that the population of the territory 
would one day outstrip the supply of fish. And if there were 
plenty of fish to go around, mere access to them would be 
enough. 
Nonetheless, I think there are at least two good 
arguments based upon the language of the treaty and the history 
surrounding it that generally support limiting the treaty rights 
concerning off-reservation fishing to rights of access. First, 
viewed in historical perspective it makes the most sense to 
understand the "common" right to be one of access. The main 
purpose of the treaties was to separate the Indians from the 
ever-increasing number of settlers by placing the former onto 
reservations. On these reservations, Indians were given 
exclusive rights to take fish. But the negotiators apparently 
recognized that the fish obtainable within the confines of the 
reservations would be insufficient for the Indians' needs. 
Under common law principles in force at the time, settlers who 
took title to land along the river banks would hold the 
exclusive right to take fish from the river. Accordingly, to 
preserve the Indians' riqhts to take any fish from off-
reservation locations (indeed, to preserve the right to get to 
5. 
such locations), the treaty secured the right "to take fish ••• in 
common with" residents of the Territory. Thus viewed, this 
right was a right of access--a right to take some fish from off 
of the reservation--rather than a right to take a particular 
percentage of all the fish. 
Second, the language of the treaties, viewed as a whole, 
does not support Justice Stevens' interpretation. There were 
two different fishing rights given to the Indians: exclusive 
rights for fishing on the reservations, and "common" rights for 
fishing at usual and accustomed Indian fishing spots off of the 
reservations. Justice Stevens must concede, however, that the 
exclusive rights for reservation fishing were rights of access 
only, for otherwise the Indians would have the right to take all 
of the fish passing through their reservation. But no 
explanation is given for why the common rights should not be 
read like the exclusive rights as rights of access only. 
Indeed, Justice Stevens' reading of this language makes 
little sense. If the Indians reserved the absolute right to 
take half of the fish from locations off of the reservation, 
then why was there a special, exclusive right to take fish on 
the reservation? Under the Court's rationale, the Indians can 
6. 
take only up to 50% of any given fishery, and fish caught on the 
reservation apply toward this quota. But if one has a right to 
certain fish--irrespective of their location--it hardly makes 
any difference that only that person can fish in a certain area. 
Rather, the "exclusive" right makes sense only if the fisheries 
were not meant to be apportioned, for then access is crucial. 
In order to avoid making the exclusive reservation right a 
nullity, therefore, it makes the most sense to interpret the in 
"common" right to be, like the exclusive right, one of access 
alone. 
b. Prior Decisions 
Nor do the cases require the reading Justice Stevens 
has given the treaties. Perhaps the case most directly on point 
is United States v. Winans, 198 u.s. 371 (1905). In that case, 
a settler constructed several fish wheels in the Columbia River 
at a place where reservation Indians usually fished. These fish 
wheels apparently took from the river virtually every salmon 
swimming upstream, thereby giving the settler a monopoly on the 
fishery in that river. The Indians brought an action 
challenging the use of the fish wheels, claiming that it 
violated their treaty rights to "tak[e] fish at all usual and 
accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory." 
This Court upheld the Indians, stating that "in the actual 
taking of fish white men may not be confined to a spear or crude 
net, but it does not follow that they may construct and use a 
device which gives them exclusive possession of the fishing 
places, as it is admitted a fish wheel does." ..!.9...:., at 382 
(emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the primary basis for 
the Court's decision was the fact that the use of the fish 
wheels interfered with the Indians' right of access. This 
interpretation is confirmed by the opinion of the District 
Court, quoted at length in this Court's opinion, which noted 
that the operation of the fishing wheels "necessitates the 
7. 
exclusive possession of the space occupied by the wheels." Id., 
at 380. And indeed the Solicitor General's brief in Winans, 
referred to approvingly by the Court, advocated only "a way of 
access, free ingress and egress to and from the fishing 
grounds." The Court in Winans, therefore, apparently understood 
the treaties to secure nothin.g more than a right of access to 
the usual Indian fishing places. 
Justice Stevens also finds support for his views in the 
Puyallup cases, which involved Indian fishing rights under the 
1854-1855 treaties. In Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of 
Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (Puyallup I), the Court ruled that 
fishing regulations could be imposed upon Indians fishing at 
their "usual and accustomed" spots only to the extent necessary 
for conservation. As Justice Stevens suggests, the Court's 
decision in Puyallup I indicates that the treaties guaranteed 
something more than just "equal access" for the Indians, 
inasmuch as non-Indians plainly were subject to regulations not 
_t. ... 
8. 
connected with conservation. Puyallup I does not, however, 
undermine an interpretation of the treaties that would give 
Indians only a right of access (albeit access greater than that 
allowed non-Indians). As I have suggested, a plausible reading 
of the treaties is that Indians were given the right to go to 
their usual fishing spots and take some fish from those spots. 
This was not because everyone else in the Territory had this 
right. Quite the contrary, the danger the Indians sought to 
avoid apparently was that they, like other residents of the 
Territory, would be prevented from reaching their usual fishing 
spots by those who acquired land along the waterfront. Thus 
understood, Puyallup I stands only for the proposition that the 
only restrictions that may be placed upon Indians fishing at one 
of their usual and accustomed spots are those restrictions 
necessary for conservation purposes. It certainly does not 
suggest that Indians must be guaranteed a certain percentage of 
each fishery. 
Washington Game Department v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 
44 (1973)(Puyallup I~), is somewhat more difficult to explain. 
In that case, the Court considered the question whether a ban on 
all net fishing for steelhead trout in the Puyallup River 
violated the Indian treaties insofar as it kept Indians from 
fishing at their usual and accumstomed places by use of nets. 
The rule did not run afoul of the Court's decision in Puyallup 
lr inasmuch as it was uncontradicted that, if the Indians were 
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allowed to use nets and non-Indians were allowed to maintain 
their sport fishing rate, the Puyallup River fishery would be 
destroyed. Nonetheless, the Court struck down the state ban on 
the Indians' net fishing, finding that, although the rule on its 
face did not treat Indians differently from non-Indians, in 
effect it discriminated against the Indians "because all Indian 
net fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely 
pre-empted by non-Indians, is allowed." 414 U.S., at 48 
(emphasis added). Thus, it appears that, for whatever reason, 
limiting the Indians to line fishing in the Puyallup River would 
have meant that the Indians would have obtained no fish 
whatsoever. See ibid., at 46-47 s("The ban on all net fishing in 
the Puyallup River for steelhead [trout] grants, in effect the 
entire run to the sports fishermen"). Indeed, the Solicitor 
General in Puyallup II objected to the ban on net fishing 
because "[i]t subordinates the Tribe's rights to those of sports 
fishermen and gives the Tribe only what might be left after the 
sports fishermen of unlimited number have had their take." 
Brief of Respondent in Puyallup II, O.T. 1972, No. 481, p. 18. 
The remedy prescribed by the Court in Puyallup II was 
an allocation of the Puyallup River salmon among the Indians and 
the non-Indians. The Court declined to make any specific 
allocation, however, preferring to leave it up to the District 
Court. On remand, the District Court made a roughly 45-55% 
allocation between Indians and non-Indians, repectively. 
1 0 • 
Despite the Court's approval of allocation in Puyallup II, it 
does not necessarily follow that Indians' common fishing rights 
under the treaties generally must take the form of a right to 
take a specified percentage of the fisheries passing their 
lands. Rather, under Puyallup II two factors must converge 
before an apportionment is necessary: (1) conservation must 
require that limitations be placed upon the amount of fish to be 
taken or upon the means by which they are to be taken; and (2) 
application of regulations which are neutral on their face must 
in fact place upon the Indians an undue portion ~/ of the burden 
of the required conservation. 
In the present case, I suspect that there is little 
doubt but that conservation requires the State of Washington to 
place , some limitations upon the methods by which fish may be 
cauqht and upon the amount that may be caught. It is far from 
clear, however, that application of neutral regulations (such as 
a catch limitation per boat or per fisherman) would impose the 
burden of conservation upon the Indians alone. Indeed, the 
*/ In Puyallup II the burden placed upon the Indians was undue 
because, as the Solicitor General pointed out, the State 
regulation totally subordinated Indian fishing rights to those 
of non-Indians. The present cases may require the Court to 
decide what short of total subordination amounts to "undue" 
burdening of Indian fishing rights. As I understand it, Justice 
Stevens would argue that any regulations required by 
conservation that do not guarantee to the Indians roughly 50% of 
the fish passing their land will necessarily impose the burden 
of conservation upon the Indians to too great a degree. 
1 1 • 
State argues that the fisheries at issue in these cases are 
quite different from that at issue in Puyallup II because the 
Indians are entitled to fish at the very mouths of the bodies of 
water. Thus, there is no danger that, if the Indians are· 
subjected to restrictions similar to those imposed upon non-
Indians, there will be too few fish to be caught by the time 
they reach the Indians. Absent this peculiar configuration, 
application of even-handed regulations will not discriminate 
against the Indians, and therefore apportionment should not be 
required under Puyallup II. 
Finally, Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 
U.S. 165 (1977)(Puyallup III), is of little assistance in 
deciding the issue in the present cases. The Court in that case 
decided only that the regulations permitted in Puyallup I could 
be applied against Indian fishing on the reservations, as well 
as off of them. 
c. Recommendation 
As you see from this memorandum, this case is fairly 
complex and the arguments seem to me difficult. There are two 
different ways in which a dissent might be written to Justice 
Stevens' proposed opinion. First, we could challenge his 
initial determination that a specific apportionment is required. 
Thus, it seems to me that he jumps too quickly to his conclusion 
that the treaties--as written and as interpreted by this Court--
require an apportionment of fish in every case. I have 
1 2 0 
suggested some arguments based on the language and history of 
the treaties and this Court's prior decisions why a different 
approach may be appropriate. In my view, Puyallup II is the 
only real sticking point. Nonetheless, on the basis of the 
reading I have done heretofore, it seems to me that even that 
case may be distinguished. At the very least it seems that the 
appropriate course would be to remand to the District Court for 
findings whether the unique conditions present with respect to 
the Puyallup River Salmon are present here as well. Indeed, it 
appears that this may be what the State of Washington is asking 
for. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 30-31. 
Alternatively, we could concede that an apportionment 
is required and challenge Justice Stevens' 50-50 presumption. 
There are at least two reasons for doing so. First, he assumes 
that the right to take fish is one held by the Indians as a 
group, rather than a right held by each individual Indian. But 
if the right were for each Indian to take fish in common with 
others (Indian and non-Indian), then apportionment should be 
made among all those who take fish--not just between the Indians 
as a group and the non-Indians as a group. And this Court in 
Winans explicitly indicated that treaty fishing rights "are 
reserved .•• to every individual Indian, as though named therein." 
198 u.s., at 381. If the apportionment were done on such a per 
capita basis, of course, the portion given to the Indians would 
be far less than 50%. Indeed, if the State of Washington's 
1 3. 
brief is to be believed, such an apportionment would place the 
Indians in a worse position than they were before this action 
was brought, for it appears that the Indians long have taken 
more fish from Washington waters per person than have non-
Indians. 
Assuming that allocation by group is proper, however, 
there still are difficulties with Justice Stevens' position. 
The treaties were negotiated with individual tribes--not with 
the Indians en masse. Thus, I can see no good reason for saying 
that although "common" means "half," each tribe understood that 
the half for which it bargained would be diminished by the 
shares of all of the other tribes that entered into treaties 
with the non-Indians. 
David 
rll Following our accidental discussion on •rhursday, I 
,, volunteered to relieve Bill Rehnquist of the task of tryin9 
to qet somet.hinq on paper for us to consider. . . 
I send to each of you here with a memorandum 
prepared by my clerk, David Westin. In the limited time 
available, l think David has done a fine piece of work with -
I am afraid -little help from me. 
r·, 
, 'i'he queation now is where do we qo from here. The.~ 
view sev~ral of us expressed at Conference that a 50-50 
division of tbe fisb was not acceptable, remains my view -
.d~'lspite th~ excellence of John • s opinion. Nor do I think any 
mathematical division of the fish is either required by the 
treaty or makes a.ny sense. The more difficult question (as r 
we all recognize) is ; who.t docs make sense, consistently with 
the treaty? ' " ~ ' 
l Subject to further discussion, I am inclined to 
agree with the view advanced in the enclosed memorandum that 
the language and nistory of the treaty (including its 
interpretation in Winan's, 198 u.s. 371), properly requires 
that it be construe<! as ·<juaranteeinq only a "riqht of access" ,. 
in common. It really mak.es no sense to say that some ,, 
specified p~rcentaqe is in effect quaranteed. There is the , > 
problem of Puxallue II, althouqh I believe this can be ~ 
distinguished as suggested by David's memo. 
If we were to agr~e that the right is limited to 
access in common, the question remains as to exactly bow we 
describe the result of that interpretation. 1 suppose we 
could, as David Westin suggests as one possibility, remand to 
the District Court which is better situated than we are to 






;§u:pume <!fanrl ttf t:Irt ~h ;§tlrlts 
~ru>frittg~ ~. <!J. Wgt~~ 
C HAMBERS O F" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 7, 1979 
Re: No. 77-983 -Washington v. Washington State Ass'n 
Dear Potter, Byron and Lewis: 
I am in general agreement with Lewis' proposal of 
June 6th, and with the memorandum of David Westin which he 
enclosed with it. I would be willing to see it written out 
along those lines, and think any inconsistencies between the 
views expressed in the memo and Puyallup II would be no greater 

















~ttptttttt <.!fonrllt! tJrt~b .itatts 
'Jht.sfrhtg4nt. ~. <!f. 2ll&t~ $ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 7, 1979 
Re: No. 77-983 - Washington v. Washington 
State Ass'n 
Dear Lewis, 
I have read David Westin's memorandum with 
interest, and I think he has done a fine job in the 
limited time available. Perhaps it would expedite 
matters if the four of us could meet to talk this 
over after each of us has had a chance to read the 
memorandum and collect his thoughts. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ttprtutt Qflturlttf tJrt ~tb ~tzdtg 
.agfrhtghttt. !D. <!f. 2llP:11~ 
June 8, 1979 
Re: No. 77-983 -Washington v. Washington State Ass'n 
Dear Lewis: 
I would be more than happy to meet with you, Potter, 
/ 
and Byron, in accordance with the suggestion contained in 
Potter's . letter of June 7th, at any mutually convenient time. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Mr. Justice Stewart 







Washington v. United States, No. 78-119 
First Draft of Dissentinq Opinion 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join parts I-III of the Court's opinion. \ 
\ 
I cannot I 
he Indians traditionally have fished be reserved for their 
xclusive use. On the contrary, the lanquaqe ~~~ r...e,. and 
history of the treaties, as subsequently interpreted by this 
\ 
Court, plainly indicate that the fishing rights reserved by the 
I dians were rights of access only. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
At issue in these cases is the meaninq of * oiR~le 
fou d in each of the six Indian treaties neqotiated and 
siqned in 1854 and 1855.1/ F.ach of the treaties provided 
substantially that "[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and 
accustomed qrounds and stations is further secured to said 
Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of 
~ #1·~ 
erecting temporary houses for the purpose of The 
2. 
question before us is whether this "common" fishing right is a 
~) 
~k 
accustomed fishing s~~c 1~ right only ~ ~usual and 
fish~ or includes the greater riqht to exclude others from 
taking a particular portion of the fish that pass throuqh the 
sites. As the Court observes, at the time the treaties were 
signed there was no need directly to address this question, for 
'"--kJ ~~ a~ . 
the surfeit of fish made lack of access the only constraint upon 
-1 
supply. Nonetheless, I believe that the fairest inference to be 
drawn from the languager o~~~e,. and history of the treaties 
~ 
is that the Indians sought and retained only the right to qo to 
their accustomed fishing places and there fish along with non-
Indians. 
,.~ 
Nothing in the language of the treaties 
any party understood that constraints would be placed on the 
amount of fish that anyone could take r~ contrary, the -'\ . 
-
t>fplain meaning of the languaqe is that non-Indians would be 
4A'~ 
( 
allowed ~~~al freedom to take fish alQ~ with Indians 
in areas where the Indians traditionally had fished. United 
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). This interpretation is 
confirmed by the language used in the treaty negotiated with the 
Yakima Tribe, which explicitly includes what apparently is 
implicit in each of the treaties: the Indians' right to take 
fish on their reservations is exclusive. Thus, the Yakima 
3. 
treaty provides that "[t]he exclusive right of takinq fish in 
all the streams where running throuqh or borderinq said 
reservation, is further secured to said confederated tribes and 
bands of Indians, as also the right of takinq fish at all usual 
and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the 
Territory •••• " 12 Stat. 951. The Court apparently concedes 
that this exclusive riqht to take fish does not mean that the 
Indians are entitled to all of the fish that would pass their 
reservation if left unmolested. Indeed, the Court would~ 
~reduce the IndianJ 50 percent portion by those fish 
caught on the reservation. See ~, at But there is no 
. / 
reason apparent from the lanquaqe used in the treaties why the 
"right of taking fish" means one thing for purposes of the 
exclusive riqht of reservation fishing and quite another for 
purposes of the "common" right of fishing at usual and 
accustomed places. The most reasonable conclusion, therefore, 
is that when the Indians and Governor Stevens agreed upon a 
"riqht of taking fish," they understood this riqht to be one of 
acces~~ve access with respect to fishinq places on the 
reservation, and common access with respect to fishing places 
off of the reservation.3/ 
In addition to the language ana st~~ of the 
treaties, the historical setting in which they were negotiated 
4. 
supports the inference that the fishing rights secured for the 
Indians were rights of access alone. The primary purpose of the 
six treaties negotiated by Governor Stevens was to resolve 
growing disputes between the settlers claiming title to land in 
the Washington Territory under the Land Donation Act of 1850, 9 
Stat. 437, and the Indians who had occupied the land for 
generations. Under the bargain struck in the treaties, the 
Indians ceded their claims to vast tracts of land, retaining 
only certain specified areas as reservations, where they would 
have exclusive rights of possession and use. In exchange, the 
Indian tribes were given substantial sums of money and were 
/ 
promised various forms of aid. See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine ; 
Creek, 10 Stat. 1132. By thus separating the Indians from the 
settlers it was hoped that friction could be minimized. 
The negotiators apparently realized, however, that 
restricting the Indians to relatively small tracts of land might 
interfere with their securing food. See Letter of George Gibbs 
to Captain McClellan, App. 326 ("[the Indians] require the 
liberty of motion for the purpose of seeking, in their proper 
season, roots, berries, and fish"). This necessary "liberty of 
motion" was jeopardized by the title claims of the settlers 
whose land abutted--or would abut--the waterways from which fish 
traditionally had been caught. Thus, in Governor Stevens' 
5. 
report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he noted the 
tension between the land rights afforded settlers under the 1850 
Land Donation Act and the Indians' need to have some access to 
the fisheries. Although he expressed the view that "[ilt never 
could have been the intention of Congress that Indians should be 
excluded from their ancient fisheries," he noted that "no 
condition to this effect was inserted in the donation act," and 
therefore recommended the question "should be set at rest by 
law." Report of Governor Stevens to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, App. 327. Viewed within this 
common fishing riqht reserved to 
, 
1854 and 1855 could only have been the rightAto rea~ eft QE 
~-~ 
resex:ua-J;.iePJ:s ~ o-r~ ~ rea~ fish at ~ locations 
1\ 
traditionally used by the Indians for this purpose. On the 
other hand, there is no historical indication that either side 
to the treaties understood that the Indians would be 
specifically guaranteed some set portion of the fisheries to 
which they traditionally had haa ~ ac 
II 
Insofar as prior decisions of this Court speak to the 
question of the extent of Indian rights under the treaties\ of 
- c:U_/~t. 1-.A-1 /HA I~ ~J 
1854 and 1 855, those decisions;_ ee-nfirm tha,t; +el:le---f.H;.hi-n ',.q.hts l. 
1 ./~ . J ' I ~I ""( 
~~~ 1~..,-.~~{q ~ ~41\,~orr 




nly. -Perhaps the case most directly on point is Unifed State~ _; 
v; Winans, 198 u.s. 371 (190.:;_jl~- th~ case a settler had 
- -- ------
constructed several fish wheels in the Columbia River. These 
fish wheels were built at locations where the Indians 
traditionally had fished, and "'necessitate[d] the exclusive 
possession of the space occupied by the wheels,'" Ibid~, at 
380, thereby interferinq with the Indians' treaty right of 
access~ ~~urt reviewed in some detail the precise nature 
of the Indians' fishinq rights under the Yakima Treaty, and 
concluded that the treaties, 
r Winans 
abridged, 
" ••• reserved riqhts ••• to every individual Indian, as 
though named therein. They imposed a servitude upon 
every piece of land as though described therein. 
There was an exclusive ~ight of f ishing r eserved 
wtihin certain boundari e s. There was a right 
outside of those boundaries reserved 'in common with 
citizens of the Territory.' As a mer e riqht , it was 
not exclusive in the Indians. Ci tizens might share 
it, but the Indians were secured in its en j oyment by 
a special provision of means for its exercise. They 
were given 'the right of takinq fish at all usual 
and accustomed places,' and the riqht 'of erecting 
temporary buildings for curing them.' The 
contingency of the future ownership of the lands, 
therefore, was foreseen and provided for--in other 
words, the Indians were qiven a riqht in the land--
the rignr-of crossino-Tt to the r1ver--the-ri~to 
occupy lt to the extenr-and for the purpose 
mentioned. No other conclusion would give effect to 
the treaty." (Emphasis added.) 
the Court concluded that this right of access had been 
stating r thaj "in the actual taking of fish white men 
may not be confined to a spear or crude net, but it does not 
7. 
follow that they may construct and use a device which qives them 
exclusive possession of the fishing places, as it is admitted a 
fish wheel does." Id;, at 382 (emphasis added). Thus, Winans 
was decided upon the basis of a treaty-secured right of access 
alone. Moreover, the Court's analysis of the treaty right at 
issue in Winans strongly indicates that nothing more than a 
right of access ~-rd) fairlyA be inferred from the treaty·.!/ 
____... 
l Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the common fishing 
right of the treaty to require an apportionment of Washington 
State fisheries. M\ eve-pY 8a&li. In Puyallup Tribe · v. -Dept. of 
Game of Washington, 391 u.s. 392 (1968)(Puyallup I), the Court 
~4~S"4~· .; 
ruled that He-l:l~~ regulations A could interfere with the Indi-ails' 
~,It:>;;:,'·~,.~ 
rightf ~ a~e-Ji.o their "usual and accustomed" fishing spots 
only to the extent necessary for conservation. The Court 
observes that this connotes something more than mere "equal 
access" for the Indians, inasmuch as non-Indians plainly were 
subject to regulations not connected with conservation. See 
~,at Puyallup I does not, however, indicate that the 
treaties should be interpreted as securing anything other than 
some form of a right of access. As noted above, the history and 
the language of the accords suggest that the right of taking 
fish in common with residents of the Territory was included 
within the treaties in order to assure that Indians would be 
8. 
able to Leav e their reservations and owned 
landsJ their 
~t­
traditional fishing s~ in fish. 
Under the Land Donation Act and the common law of property, this 
' 
~.u,l ... ?1-M-
right was not one shat:'-e.C by G¥-eF-Yl resident> i-A. "'-the Terri tory. 
r'\ 1\ . "-- /.r t 
Quite the contrary, the danger the Indians sought to avoid was 
r in part / that they, like others, would be excluded from private 
s ~ rut nt~~ ~ ~ 
land--i"'Fl:--e"'f: E-e-e.G.. t.hos.e settlers who Celll!O eo own land along 
1\ .1\ /1 
the banks of the various waterways would ee~bo have an 
effective monopoly upon the taking of fish. See supra, at 
Thus understood, Puyallup I confirms that the treaties secured 
~ 1-o~~-- ·. /A 
onl~rightf of access
1 
fo~ ~cce ss greater than that generally 
~ ""' available to residents of the Territory was precisely what th~ 
Indians bargained for and received. J 
In permitting t he State to place limitations on the 
I ndians' access rights when conservation so requires, the Cou r t 
went farther in Puyallup I and suggested that even regulations 
t h us justified would have to satisfy the requirements of "equal 
protection implicit in the phrase 'in common wi t h.'" 391 u.s., 
au,...,J..., 4 
a t 40 3 . Kn Washington · Game Department v. Puyallup ·Tribe, 414 
A 
U • S . 4 4 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ( P u y a 11 up I I) , ..... ~00-l~cif>"'~l-Wii-i~~.s;r.,J.,,! =Ao~--,d ~ 
considered whether the conservation measures taken by the State 
~ had been even-handed in the~ treatment of the 
Indians. At issue was a Washington State ban on all net 
9. 
fishing--by both Indians and non-Indians--for steelhead trout in 
the Puyallup River. According to testimony before the trial 
court, the annual run of steelhead trout in the Puyallup River 
was between 16,000 and 18,000, while unlimited sport fishing 
would result in the taking of between 12,000 and 14,000 
steelhead annually. Because at least 25% of the entire run was 
required for escapement for hatcheries and spawning, the sport 
aJ)( 
fishing totally preempted ~ commercial fishing what~Q•;er by 
~~Yk.s~~~ ~ 
claimed that this ban amounted to an improper subordination of 
their treaty rights to[,.....,.~!li.aR.,.. p rivileqe of 
1
recreational 
fishing/~_d)_ 4 ~ '-;'~ 
~ 
We in Puyallup II that the ban on net fishing, 
~ inse~er as it applied to Indians covered by treaty, wa~ . ) "" 
·~~u-1 ~ ~A./-s, 
i~~ M' e-ff~ 'the State in the name of conservation was 
discriminating against the Indians "because all Indian net 
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely ure-
empted by non-'-Indians, is allowed." 414 U.S., at 48 ~emphasis r 
~~). Because "[o]nly an expert could fairly estimate what 
degree of net fishing plus fishing by hook and line would allow 
the escapement of fish necessary for perpetuation of the 
species," Ibid., at 48, we remanded to the Washington courts for 
a fair apportionment of the steelhead run between Indian net 
1 0. 
fishing and non-Indian sport fishing. 1 Despite the Court's ) 
statements to the contrary, see ~' at , we did not rule in 
in the State Qf~aBR~A~ must be apportioned between Indian 
and non-Indian fishermen. Rather, the question before the Cour 
that case was the narrow one whether the State was free to 
exhalt methods of 
~ 
~dian methods_of 
used exclusively by non-Indians over 
once it was determined that some 
regulation of fishing was required for purposes of conservation~ 
) Having decided that some regulation was required, but that the 
treaty forbad the State to choose to regulate only Indian 
fishing for conservation purposes, we remanded for an 
apportionment between net fishing and sport fishing 
1-- ~ --------------------~/ 
Emerging from our decisions inl1Uyailup · r and Puyallup 
i\ 
!!r therefore, is the proper approach to interpretation of the 
Indians' common fishinq rights at the present time, when demand 
outstrips supply. The Indians have the right to qo to their 
traditional fishing grounds to fish. Once there, they cannot be 
restricted in their methods or in the size of their take, save 
insofar as restrictions are required for t:Re ~lre e-f conservinq 
the fisheries from which they draw. Even in situations where 
such regulations are required, however, the State must be even-
handed in limiting Indian and non-Indian fishing activity. It 
is not free to make the determination--apparently made by 
Washington with respect to the ban on net fishing in the 
Puyallup River--that Indian fishing riqhts will be ~ 
subordinated to the interests of non-Indians. 
III 
- In the present case, the District Court did not find 
particular State fishing regulation to be invalid because it 
I restricted impermissibly the Indians' right to take fish at 
their usual and accustomed fishinq places. Rather, after 
concluding that Indian fishing off of the reservation properly 
was subject to some State regulation in the interests of 
/ 
conservation, the court immediately considered an apportionmen~ 
between Indians and non-Indians, noting that "[b]y dictionary 
definition ••• 'in common with' means sharing equally." 384 
\ F.Supp., at 343. The court interpreted this equal sharinq to 
require that "non-treaty fishermen shall have the opportunity to 
take up to 50% of the harvestable number of fish that may be 
taken by all fishermen at usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations and treaty right fishermen shall have the opportunity 
I to take up to the same percentage of harvestable fish •••. " 
Ibid. 
In my view wet=~ a ~ubstanLial de~art:ure 
11...~~~ 
ti-'~FeO.f!'lft~eHW,J.:l~ p~r'*i.-E;o~;r;.....J;c:::.iaaoslii:e~s.-----ITuoud;).j'ii"~liiCI., j n e f f e c t j rt reform 4t( the 
1 2. 
a 
struck with the Indians in 1854-1855 to conform with what~WQ IZIW 
~perceive as a just result. Under Puyallup I it is plain 
1 
that the State of Washington properly can impose regulations on 
Indians as well as non-Indians when it is necessary so. n 
~~-~~ r to preserve and protect the fisheries of the State. But 
the regulations promulgated for this purpose need not take the 
form of a specific apportionment of the harvestable fish between 
Indians and non-Indians. Under our decision in Puyallup II the 
Indians' right under the treaties is only to be free even from 
conservation-based fishing regulation where it is shown that the 
State in structuring its conservation program has chosen to 
subordinate the rights of Indian fishermen to those of non-
Indians. Here there was no such showing. On the contrary, from 
~Rt that appears in the record, the regulations in force at 
the time of the District Court's decision were entirely even-
handed. / Nothing more is required by the treaties, save insofar 
as access to the fishing places is concerned. 
To be sure, the unforeseen circumstances developing in 
the last 115 years~ have affected seriously the Indians' 
ability to catch fish in the Pacific Northwest. This is not the 
result, however, of State regulation, but rather of chanoes in 
the population of the area and in the technology that makes 
commercial fishing an attractive business. To some extent the 
1 3 0 
disadvantages visited upon the Indians from these finavoidabi~J' 
changes may be ameliorated by special federal programs to 
modernize the Indians' fishing equipment in order to make them 
truly competitive with their non-Indian counterparts. But this 
Court should not undertake to rewrite the treaties of 1854-1855 
in order to achieve what it may perceive to have been a just 
bargain in retrospect. I therefore would reverse the judqment 
of the Ninth Circuit and remand for consideration whether the 
regulations in force before the District Court acted in this 
case were based upon the State's decision to subordinate the 
Indians' fishing riqhts to those of the non-Indi~ns~ 
Footnotes 
1. Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point 
Elliott, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933; 
Treaty with the Makahs, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Yakimas, 
12 Stat. 951; Treaty of Olympia, 12 Stat. 971. 
2. Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra, at 1133. There were some 
slight, immaterial variations in the languaqe used. See, e~g;, 
Treaty with the Yakimas, quoted infra, at 
3. Indeed, if the Court's interpretation of the treaties were 
correct, then the exclusive right with respect to reservation 
fishing would be largely superfluous. If the Indians had the 
right to 50%, and no more, of the fish irrespective of where 
they are caught, then it hardly would be of any great value to 
them that they could keep others from taking fish from locations 
on the reservation. The most reasonable way to interpret the 
exclusive right of reservation fishing so that it was of value, 
therefore, is as a special right of access. 
4. The Government's brief in Winans, cited approvinqly by the 
Court in that case, indicates that the Government also 
understood the treaty to guarantee nothing more than access 





Government advocated only "a way of access, free ingress and 
egress to and from the fishinq qrounds." Brief for Appellant, 
No. 180, O.T. 1904, p. 56. 
This interpretation of Winans was uueqa~ca!ty affirmed by 
the Court a short time later in Seufert Bros~ Co; v. ·united 
States, 249 u.s. 194 (1919). At issue in that case was whether 
Indians from the Yakima nation had the right under their treaty 
to cross the Columbia River and fish from the south bank, which 
admittedly had belonged to other tribes at the time of the 
treaty. The Court viewed Seufert, a case unquestionably 
involvinq only the riqht of access, to be squarely controlled by 
its earlier decision in Winans. 249 u.s., at 198. Moreover, • <" 
' 
the Court reaffirmed its view that the effect of the reservation 
of common fishing riqhts to the Indians amounted to a servitude. 
Ibid., at 199.] 
5. Puyallup Tribe v. Washinqton · Game · nept~, 433 u.s. 165 
(1977)(Puyallup III), is of little assistance in deciding the 
issue in the present cases. The Court in that case decided only 
that the regulations permitted in Puyallup · I could be applied 
against Indian fishing on the reservations, as well as off of 
them. 
LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 1 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
I am not in agreement, however, with the Court's conclusion 
that the treaties negotiated in 1854 and 1855 with the 
Indians of the Washington Territory require, as a starting 
point for determining the fishing rights of Indians and non-
Indians, a "5o-5~ division of all fish passing land upon which 
the Indians traditionally have fished. ,Ante, at 25 et seq. 
Court's opinion, as I read 
t b\1~ SoiC'Wif'\1\\' .J 
~~etsaw division between the contending parties, 
subject to some downward adjustment on the Indians' side. 
L~-\rlo4t) t he treaty language to "take fish • • . in common" ~ 
~ gQ~5tr~9Q to require ~Ri8~ The Court apparently views the 
treaties as guaranteeing iA effeee { to the Indians a 
specified percentage of the runs of the anadromous fish in 
. 1 J f'\,&. +r&ti urt .J 
As I do not believe the language and history [can question. 

















LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 2 JB-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
In short, they won a right of access to fish. In addition, 
the Indians retained the exclusive right to take fish on 





LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider B, pg. 2 78-119 Wash. v. U.S. 
Quite to the contrary, ~the language confers upon non-
;d:- s 
Indians the same right as i~ conferree upon Indian~ even in " " , ·r -sf i-4<.& __, areas where the Indians traditionally had fished. U S ~
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). It hardly~ could be argued 
that Congress 




















LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 5 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
All that the Indians had before non-Indians arrived in the 
Territory was the natural right to fish, a right exercised at 
identifiable locations. All that the treaties sensibly could 
have provided was the preservation of a right of access to 
these locations for the purpose of fishing there in common 
with non-Indians who had such access. 
II 
Prior decisions of this Court have prevented the 
~ dilution of these treaty rights, but none addressed the 
issue ~ l, ~ before us. I read these decisionsas 
supporting the view expressed above. T~is is particularly 





LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 6 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
~ 
The Court thus ~ these treaties as intending to "give[] a 
right in the land" - - a "servitude" upon all non-Indian land 
- to enable Indians to fish "in common with citizens of the 
Territory". The focus was on access to the traditional 
fishing areas for the purpose of enjoying the "right of 
w~~ 
fishing". Id., at 380. The ~ourt concluded, on the facts 
~ 
before it )~' that the right of access to fish in 
these areas had been abridged. It stated that 
,•' 
! ' 
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LFP/lab 6/1 ~/79 Rider A, pg. 7 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
fY Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the treaties to require 
that any specified proportion of the catch be reserved for 
Indians. Indeed, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of 
Washington, 391 U. S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I), consistently 
with Winans, described the right of Indians under the 
treaties as "the right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed 
plac1'." Id., at 398.* The issue before the Court in 
Puyallup I was the extent to which the state could regulate 
fishing. It held: 
" •• the 'right' to fish outside the 
reservation was a treaty 'right' that could 
not be qualified or conditioned by the State. 
But 'the time and manner not being defined or 
established by the treaty, were within the 
reach of state power." Id. at 399. 
*The treaty right was ~ referred to in 
Puyallup I as a "right to fish~ This term was used no less 
distinction 
~take fish". 
in the course of the opinion, with ~ 
being made between the right "to fish" ana ~o 
'1 




LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider }\, pg. 7 78-119 Wash. v. U.S. 
The Court today finds support for its views in 
Puyallup I because the Court there recognized that apart from 
conservation measures, the State could not impose restrictive 
regulations on the treaty rights of Indians. It does not 
follow from this that an affirmative right to a specified 
percentage of the catch is guaranteed by the treaties. The 
Court misappreciates the nature of the basic right sought to 
be preserved by Congress. This, as noted above, was a right 
of access by Indians to their usual and accustomed fishing 
areas - a right to reach these areas - described in Winans as 
a servitude or right over land not owned by Indians. Putting 
it differently, this is a right to trespass on any land when 
necessary to reach the traditional fishing areas, and is a 
right not enjoyed by non-Indian residents of the Territory or 
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LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 1 0 78~119 Wash. v. u.s. 
Relying upon the reference in Puyallup II to 
"apportionmentl the Court expansively reads the decision in 
that case as strongly implying, if not holding, that~~~ 
f~ht!!!"Ne~ at Indians' "accustomed" fishing sites in the ~tate 
must be apportioned between Indian and non-Indian fishermen. 
This view certainly is not a necessary reading of 
Puyallup II. Indeed, I view it as a quite unjustified 
extension of that case. Puyallup II addressed an extremely 
narrow question: whether there had been "discrimination" by 
state regulations under which "all Indian net fishing [was] 
barred and only hook and line fishing entirely pre-empted by 
non-Indians~lowed." Id., at 48. The entire opinion of 
the Court is confined to less than five pages of the U. s. 
Reports, and Mr. Justice Douglas stated at the outset that 
~ the issue of "allocating the catch" was mentioned "only to 
reserve decision on it". Id., at 48. In any event, to the 
extent language in Puyallup II may be read as supporting some 
general apportionment of the catch, it is dictum that is 
plainly incompatible with the language and historical 
understanding of these treaties. 
., 
'• 
LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 11 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
In my view, the district court below - and now this 
Court - has formulated an apportionment doctrine that cannot 
be squared with the language or history of the treaties, or 
indeed with the prior decision of this Court. It has been 
argued to us that the application of this doctrine, and 
specificially the construction of the term "in common" as 
requiring a basic 50-50 apportionment, will result in an 
extraordinary economic windfall to Indian fisherman in the 
commercial fish market. This is said to give them a 
substantial position in the market wholly protected from 
competition from non-Indian fishermen. Apparently, non-
Indian fishermen would be required from time to time to stay 
off fishery areas completely while Indians catch their Court-
decreed allotment. In sum, it is urged that the district 
.= 
court's decision, if affirmed in substance by this Court, 
will discriminate quite unfairly against non-Indians. I find 
it difficult to reject these arguments as being unfounded. 
To be sure, if the treaties must be construed to 
produce such a result, it would be our duty so to construe 
them. For the reasons stated above, I think the Court's 
construction virtually ignores the historical setting and 
purpose of the treaties, considerations that bear 
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the prior decisions of this Court support or justify what 
seems to me to be a substantial reformation of the bargain 
struck with the Indians in 1854-1855. 
I would hold that the treaties gave to the Indians 
two significant rights that should be respected: as made 
clear in Winans, the clear intention of the treaties was to 
assure to Indians the right of access over private lands so 
that they could continue to fish at their usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds. See also Seufert Bros. Co. v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 194 ). As subsequently 
construed, the treaties exempt Indians from state regulation 
(including the payment of license fees) except that necessary 
for conservation in the interest of all fishermen. Moreover, 
Indians have the exclusive right to fish on their 
reservations, and are guaranteed enough fish to satisfy their 
ceremonial and subsistence needs. Finally, under Puyallup 
!!r it is settled that even a facially neutral conservation 
regulation is invalid if its effect is to discriminate 
against Indian fishermen. 
The foregoing package of rights, privileges and 
exemptions - possessed only by ~Indians - is quite 
substantial. I find no basis for according additional 





LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pq. 1 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
I am not in agreement, however, with the Court's conclusion 
that the treaties negotiated in 1854 and 1855 with the 
Indians of the Washington Territory require, as a starting 
point for determining the fishing rights of Indians and non-
Indians, a 50-50 division of all fish passing land upon which 
the Indians traditionally have fished. Ante, at 25 et seq. 
The Court's opinion, as I read it, accepts the District 
Court's "50-50" division between the contending parties, 
subject to some downward adjustment on the Indians' side. 
The treaty language to "take fish • • • in common" is 
construed to require this. The Court apparently views the 
treaties as guaranteeing - in effect - to the Indians a 
specified percentage of the runs of the anadromous fish in 
question. As I do not believe the language and history can 
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LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 2 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
In short, they won a right of access to fish. In addition, 
the Indians retained the exclusive right to take fish on 
their reservations, a right not involved in this litigation. 
'• 
LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider B, pg. 2 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
Quite to the contrary, as the language confers upon non-
Indians the same right as is conferred upon Indians even in 
areas where the Indians traditionally had fished. u. S. v. 
Winans, 198 u.s. 371 (1905). It hardly even could be arqued 
that Congress intended to guarantee non-Indians any specified 
























LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 5 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
All that the Indians had before non-Indians arrived in the 
Territory was the natural right to fish, a right exercised at 
identifiable locations. All that the treaties sensibly could 
have provided was the preservation of a right of access to 
these locations for the purpose of fishing there in common 
with non-Indians who had such access. 
II 
Prior decisions of this Court have prevented the 
dilution of these treaty rights, but none have addressed the 
issue presently before us. I read these decisionsas 
supporting the view ex~ressed above. THis is particularly 
true of u. S. v. Winans, 198 u.s. 371 (1905), the case most 
directly relevant. 
'· 




LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 6 78-119 wash. v. u.s. 
The Court thus read these treaties as intending to "give[] a 
right in the land" - - a "servitude" upon all non-Indian land 
- to enable Indians to fish "in common with citizens of the 
Territory". The focus was on access to the traditional 
fishing areas for the purpose of enjoying the "right of 
fishing". Id., at 380. The Court concluded, on t.he facts 
before it in Winans, that the right Qf access to fish in 
these areas had been abridged. It stated that 
.. ' . 
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LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 7 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the treaties to require 
that any specified proportion of the catch be reserved for 
Indians. Indeed, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of 
Washington, 391 U. s. 392 {1968) {Puyallup I), consistently 
with Winans, described the riqht of Indians under the 
treaties as "the right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed 
placed'." Id., at 398.* The issue before the Court in 
Puyallup I was the extent to which the state could regulate 
fishing. It he l d: 
" •• the 'right' to fish outside the 
reservation was a treaty 'right' that could 
not be qualified or conditioned by the State. 
But 'the time and manner not being defined or 
established by the treaty, were within the 
reach of state power." Id. at 399. 
*The treaty right was repetitively referred to in 
Puyallup I as a "right to fish". This term was used no less 
than five times in the course of the opinion, with no 
distinction being made between the right "to fish" and to 
"take fish". Id., at 398-99. 
' ' 
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LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider ft. pg. 7 78-1 ,19 Wash. v. u.s. 
pA-z..;o 
The Court today finds support for its views in 
Puyallup I because the Court there recognized that apart from 
conservation measures, the State could not impose restrictive 
regulations on the treaty rights of Indians. It does not 
follow from this that an affirmative right to a specified 
percentage of the catch is guaranteed by the treaties. The 
Court misappreciates the nature of the basic right sought to 
be preserved by Congress. This, as noted above, was a right 
of access by Indians to their usual and accustomed fishing 
areas - a right to reach these areas - described in Winans as 
a servitude or right over land not owned by Indians. Putting 
' •'' 
it differently, this is a right to trespass on any land when 
necessary to reach the traditional fishing areas, and is a 
right not enjoyed by non-Indian residents of the Territory or 
such residents following statehood. 
,• 
LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 1 0 78~119 Wash. v. u.s. 
Relying upon the reference in Puyallup II to 
"apportionment", the Court expansively reads the decision in 
that case as strongly implying, if not holding, that all 
fisheries at Indians' 11 accustomed" fishing sites in the state 
must be apportioned between Indian and non-Indian fishermen. 
This view certainly is not a necessary reading of 
Puyallup II. Indeed, I view it as a quite unjustified 
extension of that case. Puyallup II addressed an extremely 
narrow question: whether there had been 11 discrimination" by 
state regulations under which "all Indian net fishing [was] 
barred and only hook and line fishing entirely pre-empted by 
non-Indians, is allowed." Id., at 48. The entire opinion of 
the Court is confined to less than five pages of the U. s. 
Reports, and Mr. Justice Douglas stated at th e outse t that 
the issue of "allocating the catch" was mentioned "only to 
reserve decision on it". Id., at 48. In any event, to the 
extent language in Puyallup II may be read as supporting some 
general apportionment of the catch, it is dictum that is 
plainly incompatible with the language and historical 
understanding of these treaties. 
;..',~_. j 
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LFP/lab 6/12/79 Rider A, pg. 11 78-119 Wash. v. u.s. 
In my view, the district court below - and now this 
Court - has formulated an apportionment doctrine that cannot 
be squared with the language or history of the treaties, or 
indeed with the prior decision of this Court. It has been 
argued to us that the application of this doctrine, and 
specificially the construction of the term "in common" as 
requiring a basic 50-50 apportionment, will result in an 
extraordinary economic windfall to Indian fisherman in the 
commercial fish market. This is said to give them a 
substantial position in the market wholly protected from 
competition from non-Indian fishermen. Apparently, non-
Indian fishermen would be required from time to time to stay 
off fishery areas completely while Indians catch their Court-
decreed allotment. In sum, it is urged that the district 
court's decision, if affirmed in substance by this Court, 
will discriminate quite unfairly against non-Indians. I find 
it difficult to reject these arguments as being unfounded. 
To be sure, if the treaties must be construed to 
produce such a result, it would be our duty so to construe 
them. For the reasons stated above, I think the Court's 
construction virtually ignores the historical setting and 
purpose of the treaties, considerations that bear 












the prior decisions of this Court support or justify what 
seems to me to be a substantial reformation of the bargain 
struck with the Indians in 1854-1855. 
I would hold that the treaties gave to the Indians 
two significant rights that should be respected: as made 
clear in Winans, the clear intention of the treaties was to 
assure to Indians the right of access over private lands so 
that they could continue to fish at their usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds. See also Seufert Bros. Co. v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 194 ). As subsequently 
construed, the treaties exempt Indians from state regulation 
(including the payment of license fees) except that necessary 
for conservation in the interest of all fishermen. Moreover, 
Indians have the exclusive riqht to fish on their 
reservations, and are guaranteed enough fish to satisfy their 
ceremonial and subsistence needs. Finally, under Puyallup 
!!r it is settled that even a facially neutral conservation 
regulation is invalid if its effect is to discriminate 
against Indian fishermen. 
The foregoing package of rights, privileges and 
exemptions - possessed only by non-Indians - is quite 
substantial. I find no basis for according additional 
advantages to Indian fishermen. 
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Potte , Byron 
' !!: ... 
After a further rather careful examination of 
central issue in ,,1this case'· I~· have concluded tha.~"~,..t.J:l~e, ~" ~ ... · 
treaties gave the ~ Indians.~a right of access over the lands of 
non-Indians to fish (to talt'e fish if they could catch them) 
· t their accustomed places'!~l._."' · 
'" ,,- ~ , ·Co:_-.+:-. ,\fl> ~ ,iiJ,;;\.1 1 . . ~ 
he enclo;sed draft of a ';"dfssent incorporates' my 
present v ews. As the draft is wr.ittf~n~ as a dissent (which 
am prepared to c~rculate), it would require substantial 
additional writing to convert it into a Court opinion - even 
in the unlikely event that four others aqreed with my view of 
the treat ieat •, Indeed, as one of you said on Monday:, 1 t -
well be too ' late for any proper Court opinion othe~ than 
1 •• ''lt.W John s. , ~·&i~. 










Washington v. United States, No. 78-119 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join parts I-III of the Court's opinion. I am not in 
agreement, however, with the Court's interpretation of the 
treaties negotiated in 1854 and 1855 with the Indians of the 
Washington Territory. The Court's opinion, as I read it, 
construes the treaties' provision "to take fish .•. in common" as 
guaranteeing the Indians a specified percentage of the runs of 
the anadromous fish passing land upon which the Indians 
traditionally have fished. Indeed, it takes as a starting point 
for determining fishing rights an equal division of these fish 
between Indians and non-Indians. ~, at 25, et seq. As I do 
not believe that the language and history of the treaties can be 
construed to support the Court's interpretation, I dissent. 
I 
At issue in these cases is the meaning of language .; ·"  
found in six similar Indian treaties negotiated and signed in 
1854 and 1855.1/ Each of the treaties provides substantially 
that "[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed 
grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians, in 
common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting 
temporary houses for the purpose of curing."~/ The question 
before us is whether this "common" fishing right is a right only 
2. 
of access to usual and accustomed fishing sites for the purpose 
of fishing there, or includes the greater right to exclude 
others from taking a particular portion of the fish that pass 
through the sites. As the Court observes, at the time the 
treaties were signed there was no need directly to address this 
question, for the surfeit of fish made lack of access to fishing 
areas the only constraint upon supply. Nonetheless, I believe 
that the compelling inference to be drawn from the language and 
history of the treaties is that the Indians sought and retained 
only the right to go to their accustomed fishing places and 
there to fish along with non-Indians. In addition, the Indians 
retained the exclusive right to take fish on their reservations, 
a right not involved in this litigation. In short, they have a 
right of access to fish. 
Nothing in the language of the treaties indicates that 
any party understood that constraints would be placed on the 
amount of fish that anyone could take, or that the Indians would 
be guaranteed a percentage of the catch. Quite to the contrary, 
the language confers upon non-Indians precisely the same right 
to fish that it confers upon Indians, even in those areas where 
the Indians traditionally had fished. United States v. Winans, 
198 u.s. 371 (1905). As it cannot be argued that Congress 
intended to guarantee non-Indians any specified percentage of 
the available fish, there is neither force nor logic to the 
argument that the same language--the "right to take fish"--does 
guarantee such a percentage to Indians. 
3. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the language used in 
the treaty negotiated with the Yakima Tribe, which explicitly 
includes what apparently is implicit in each of the treaties: 
the Indians' right to take fish on their reservations is 
exclusive. Thus, the Yakima treaty provides that "[t]he 
exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams ·where running 
through or bordering said reservation, is further secured to 
said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right 
of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common 
with citizens of the Territory ••.. " 12 Stat. 951. See ante, 
at There is no reason apparent from the language used in 
the treaties why the "right of taking fish" should mean one 
thing for purposes of the exclusive right of reservation fishing 
and quite another for purposes of the "common" right of fishing 
at usual and accustomed places. Since the Court interprets the 
right of taking fish in common to be an entitlement to half of 
the entire catch taken from fisheries passing the Indians' 
traditional fishing grounds, it therefo~e should follow that the 
Court would interpret the exclusive right of taking fish to be 
an entitlement to all of the fish taken from fisheries passing 
the Indians' reservations. But the Court apparently concedes 
that this exclusive right is not of such draconian proportions. 
Indeed, the Court would reduce the Indians' 50 percent portion 
by those fish caught on the reservation. The more reasonable 
conqlusion, therefore, is that when the Indians and Governor 
4. 
Stevens agreed upon a "right of taking fish," they understood 
this right to be one of access to fish--exclusive access with 
respect to fishing places on the reservation, and common access 
with respect to fishing places off of the reservation.)/ 
In addition to the language of the treaties, the 
historical setting in which they were negotiated supports the 
inference that the fishing rights secured for the Indians were 
rights of access alone. The primary purpose of the six treaties 
negotiated by Governor Stevens was to resolve growing disputes 
between the settlers claiming title to land in the Washington 
Territory under the Land Donation Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 437, and 
the Indians who had occupied the land for generations. Under 
the bargain struck in the treaties, the Indians ceded their 
claims to vast tracts of land, retaining only ce~tain specified 
areas as reservations, where they would have exclusive rights of 
possession and use. In exchange, the Indian tribes were given 
substantial sums of money and were promised various forms of 
aid. See,~, Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132. By 
thus separating the Indians from the settlers it was hoped that 
friction could be minimized. 
The negotiators apparently realized, however, that 
restricting the Indians to relatively small tracts of land might 
interfere wiih their securing food. See Letter of George Gibbs 
to Captain McClellan, App. 326 ("[the Indians] require the 
liberty of motion for the purpose of seeking, in their proper 
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season, roots, berries, and fish"). This necessary "liberty of 
motion" was jeopardized by the title claims of the settlers 
whose land abutted--or would abut--the waterways from which fish 
traditionally had been caught. Thus, in Governor Stevens' 
report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he noted the 
tension between the land rights afforded settlers ·under the 1850 
Land Donation Act and the Indians' need to have some access to 
the fisheries. Although he expressed the view that "[i]t never 
could have been the intention of Congress that Indians should be 
excluded from their ancient fisheries," he noted that "no 
condition to this effect was inserted in the donation act," and 
therefore recommended the question "should be set at rest by 
law." Report of Governor Stevens to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, App. 327. Viewed within this historical context, the 
common fishing right reserved to the Indians by the treaties of 
1854 and 1855 could only have been the right, over and above 
their exclusive fishing right on their reservations, to roam off 
of the reservations in order to reach fish at the locations 
traditionally used by the Indians for this purpose. On the 
other hand, there is no historical indication that any of the 
parties to the treaties understood that the Indians would be 
specifically guaranteed some set portion of the fisheries to 
which they traditionally had had access. 
II 
Prior decisions of this Court have prevented the 
dilution of these treaty rights, but none has addressed the 
issue now before us. I read these decisions as supporting the 
interpretation set forth above. This is particularly true of 
United States v. Winans, 198 u.s. 371 (1905),· the case most 
directly relevant. In that case a settler had constructed 
several fish wheels in the Columbia River. These fish wheels 
were built at locations where the Indians traditionally had 
fished, and "'necessitate[d] the exclusive possession of the 
space occupied by the wheels,'" id., at 380, thereby 
interfering with the Indians' treaty right of access to fish. 
This Court reviewed in some detail the precise nature of the 
Indians' fishing rights under the Yakima Treaty, and concluded 
that the treaties, 
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" ••• reserved rights ••. to every individual Indian, as 
though named therein. They imposed a servitude upon 
every piece of land as though described therein. ·' 
There was an exclusive right of fishing reserved 
wtihin certain boundaries. There was a right 
outside of those boundaries reserved 'in common with 
citizens of the Territory.' As a mere right, it was 
not exclusive in the Indians. Citizens might share 
it, but the Indians were secured in its enjoyment by 
a special provision of means for its exercise. They 
were given 'the right of taking fish at all usual 
and accustomed places,' and the right 'of erecting 
temporary buildings for curing them.' The 
contingency of the future ownership of the lands, 
therefore, was foreseen and provided for--in other 
words, the Indian~ were given a right in the land--
the rig~o£ crossing-It !£ the r1ver--the-rignr-to 
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occupy it to the extent and for the purpose 
mentioned. No other conclusion would give effect to 
the treaty." ~, at 381 (Emphasis added). 
The Court thus viewed these treaties as intended to 
"giv[e] a right in the land"--a "servitude" upon all non-Indian 
land--to enable Indians to fish "in common with citizens of the 
Territory." The focus was on access to the traditional fishing 
areas for the purpose of enjoying the "right of fishing." Id., 
at 380. The Winans Court concluded, on the facts before it, 
that the right of access to fish in these areas had been 
abridged. It stated that "in the actual taking of fish white 
men may not be confined to a spear or crude net, but it does not 
follow that they may construct and use a device which gives them 
exclusive possession of ~ fishing places, as it is admitted a 
fish wheel does." Id., at 382 (emphasis added). Thus, Winans 
was decided solely upon the basis of a treaty-secured right of 
access to fish. Moreqver, the Court's analysis of the treaty 
right at issue in Winans strongly indicates that nothing more 
than a right of access fairly could be inferred from the 
treaty._!/ 
Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the treaties to 
require that any specified proportion of the catch be reserved 
for Indians. Indeed, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of 
Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968)(Puyallup I), consistently with 
Winans, described the right of Indians under the treaties as 
"the right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed places.'" Id., 
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at 398.~/ The issue before the Court in Puyallup I was the 
extent to which the state could regulate fishing. It held that, 
" ... the 'right' to fish outside the reservation was 
a treaty 'right' that could not be qualified or 
conditioned by the State. But 'the time and manner 
of fishing ••• necessary for the co"nservation of 
fish,' not being defined or established by the 
treaty, were within the reach of state power." 
The Court today finds support for its views in Puyallup 
I because the Court there recognized that, apart from 
conservation measures, the State could not impose restrictive 
regulations on the treaty rights of Indians. But it does not 
follow from this that an affirmative right to a specified 
percentage of the catch is guaranteed by the tre~ties to Indians 
or to non-Indians, for the Court misapprehends the nature of the 
basic right sought to be preserved by Congress. This, as noted 
above, was a right of the Indians to reach their usual and 
accustomed fishing areas. Put differently, this right, 
described in Winans as a servitude or right over land not owned 
by the Indians, entitles the Indians to trespass on any land 
when necessary to reach their traditional fishing areas, and is 
a right not enjoyed by non-Indian residents of the area. 
In permitting the State to place limitations on the 
Indians' access rights when conservation so requires, the Court 
went farther in Puyallup I and suggested that even regulations 
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thus justified would have to satisfy the requirements of "equal 
protection implicit in the phrase 'in common with.'" 391 u.s., 
at 403. Accordingly, in Washington Game Department v. Puyallup 
Tribe, 414 u.s. 44 (1973)(Puyallup II), we considered whether 
the conservation measures taken by the State had been even-
handed in the treatment of the Indians. At issue ·was a 
Washington State ban on all net fishing--by both Indians and 
non-Indians--for steelhead trout in the Puyallup River. 
According to testimony before the trial court, the annual run of 
steelhead trout in the Puyallup River was between 16,000 and 
18,000, while unlimited sport fishing would result in the taking 
of between 12,000 and 14,000 steelhead annually. Because the 
escape of at least 25% of the entire run was required for 
hatcheries and spawning, the sport fishing totally preempted al~ 
commercial fishing by Indians. The State therefore imposed a 
ban on all net fishing. The Indians claimed that this ban 
amounted to an improper subordination of their treaty rights to 
the privilege of recreational fishing enjoyed by non-Indians. 
, ~I" 
We held in Puyallup II that the ban on net fishing, as 
it applied to Indians covered by treaty, was an infringement of 
their rights. The State in the name of conservation was 
discriminating against the Indians "because all Indian net 
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely pre-
empted by non-Indians, is allowed." 414 u.s., at 48. Bedause 
"[olnly an expert could fairly estimate what degree of net 
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fishing plus fishing by hook and line would allow the escapement 
of fish necessary for perpetuation of the species," Id., at 48, 
we remanded to the Washington courts for a fair apportionment of 
the steelhead run between Indian net fishing and non-Indian 
sport fishing. 
Relying upon the reference in Puyallup II to 
"apportionment," the Court expansively reads the decision in 
that case as strongly implying, if not holding, that the catch 
at Indians' "accustomed" fishing sites must be apportioned 
between Indian and non-Indian fishermen. This view certainly is 
not a necessary reading of Puyallup II. Indeed, I view it as a 
quite unjustified extension of that case. Puyallup II addressed 
an extremely narrow question: whether there had been 
"discrimination" by state regulations under whic~ "all Indian 
net fishing [was] barred and only hook and line fishing entirely 
pre-empted by non-Indians, [was] allowed." Id., at 48. In any 
event, to the extent language in Puyallup II may be read as 
supporting some general apportionment of the catch, it is dictum 
that is plainly incompatible with the language and historical 
understanding of these treaties.i/ 
Emerging from our decisions in Winans, Puyallup I and 
Puyallup II, therefore, is the proper approach to interpretation 
of the Indians' common fishing rights at the present time, when 
demand outstrips supply. The Indians have the right to go to 
their traditional fishing grounds to fish. Once there, they 
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cannot be restricted in their methods or in the size of their 
take, save insofar as restrictions are required for conserving 
the fisheries from which they draw. Even in situations where 
such regulations are required, however, the State must be even-
handed in limiting Indian and non-Indian fishing activity. It 
is not free to make the determination--apparently made by 
Washington with respect to the ban on net fishing in the 
Puyallup River--that Indian fishing rights will be totally 
subordinated to the interests of non-Indians. 
III 
In my view, the District Court below--and now this 
Court--has formulated an apportionment doctrine that cannot be 
squared with the language or history of the treaties, or indeed 
with the prior decisions of this Court. The application of this 
doctrine, and particularly the construction of the term "in 
common" as requiring a basic 50-50 apportionment, is likely to 
result in an extraordinary economic windfall to Indian fishermen 
in the commercial fish market by giving them a substantial 
position in the market wholly protected from competition from 
non-Indian fishermen. Indeed, non-Indian fishermen apparently 
will be required from time to time to stay out of fishing areas 
completely while Indians catch their Court-decreed allotment. 
In sum, the District Court's decision will discriminate quite 
unfairly against non-Indians. 
1 2 • 
To be sure, if it were necessary to construe the 
treaties to produce these results, it would be our duty so to 
construe them. But for the reasons stated above, I think the 
Court's construction virtually ignores the historical setting 
and purpose of the treaties, considerations that bear 
compellingly upon a proper reading of their language. Nor do 
the prior decisions of this Court support or justify what seems 
to me to be a substantial reformation of the bargain struck with 
the Indians in 1854-1855. 
I would hold that the treaties give to the Indians two 
significant rights that should be respected. As made clear in 
Winans, the purpose of the treaties was to assure to Indians the 
right of access over private lands so that they could continue 
to fish at their usual and accustomed fishing grounds. Indians 
also have the exclusive right to fish on their reservations, and 
are guaranteed enough fish to satisfy their ceremonial and 
subsistence needs. Moreover, as subsequently construed, the 
treaties exempt Indians from state regulation (including the 
payment of license fees) except that necessary for conservation 
in the interest of all fishermen. Finally, under Puyallup ,II, 
it is settled that even a facially neutral conservation 
regulation is invalid if its effect is to discriminate against 
Indian fishermen. This package of rights, privileges, and 
exemptions--possessed only by Indians--is quite substanti~l. I 
find no basis for according them additional advantages. 
Footnotes 
1. Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point 
Elliott, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933; 
Treaty with the Makahs, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Yakimas, 
12 Stat. 951; Treaty of Olympia, 12 Stat. 971. 
2. Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra, at 1133. There were some 
slight, immaterial variations in the language used. See, e.g., 
Treaty with the Yakimas, quoted infra, at 
3. Indeed, if the Court's interpretation of the treaties were 
correct, then the exclusive right with respect to reservation 
fishing would be largely superfluous. If the Indians had the 
right to 50%, and no more, of the fish irrespective of where 
they are caught, then it hardly would be of any great value to 
.them that they could keep others from taking fish from locations 
on the reservation. The most reasonable way to interpret the 
exclusive right of reservation fishing so that it was of value, 
therefore, is as a special right of access. 
4. The Government's brief in Winans, cited approvingly by the 
Court in that case, indicates that the Government also 
understood the treaty to guarantee nothing more than access 
rights to traditional fishing locations. In that brief, the 
Government advocated only "a way of access, free ingress and 
egress to and from the fishing grounds." Brief for Appellant, 
No. . 1 8 0 , 0. T. 1 9 0 4, p. 56. 
This interpretation of Winans was unequivocally affirmed by 
the Court a short time later in Seufert Bros. Co. v. United 
States, 249 u.s. 194 (1919). At issue in that case was whether 
Indians from the Yakima nation had the right under their treaty 
to cross the Columbia River and fish from the south bank, which 
admittedly had belonged to other tribes at the time of the 
treaty. The Court viewed Seufert, a case unquestionably 
involving only the right of access, to be squarely controlled by 
its earlier decision in Winans. 249 U.S., at 198. Moreover, 
the Court reaffirmed its view that the effect of the reservation 
of common fishing rights to the Indians amounted to a servitude. 
Ibid., at 199. 
5. The treaty right was repeatedly referred to in Puyallup I as 
a "right to fish." This phrase was used no less than seven 
times in the course of the opinion, with no distinction being 
made between the right "to fish" and the right "to take fish." 
Id., at 397-99. 
6. Having decided that some regulation was required, but t~at 
the treaty forbad the State to choose to regulate only Indian 
fishing for conservation purposes, we remanded for an 
apportionment between net fishing and sport fishing. Puyallup 
Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 u.s. 165 (1977)(Puyallup 
!£!), is of little assistance in deciding the issue in the 
present cases. The Court in that case decided only that the 
regulations permitted in Puyaliup I could be applied against 
Indian fishing on the res~rvations, as well as off of them. 
CHAMBERS 0"" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.:inprtutt Q}ourlltf tlrt~~ jbdtg 
~M!rittghtn. ~. "f. 2!1,?}1.$ 
June 14, 1979 
Re: No. 77-983, Washington v. United States 
Dear Lewis, 
I congratulate you and your law clerks on a 
very good job done in a very short time. If what you 
have written remains a dissenting opinion, I shall 
gladly join it. If, on the other hand, it commands 
the support of a majority, I see no practical alter-
native except to set these cases for reargument. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~JtFtntt Qj:quri l1f tlrt 'Jnittb ~fattg 
-uJringhm. ~. <!):. 2ll~~' / 
June 14, 1979 
Re: No. 77-983 -Washington v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
My sentiments with respect to your most recent draft 
in this case are the same as those conveyed to you by Potter 
in his letter of June 14th. I am firmly of the view that 
John's memorandum misconstrues the treaty7 the question of 
reargument would depend upon the amount of work which would 
inevitably fall on you and your chambers in converting what 
is now a dissent into a majority opinion if it attracts four 
votes other than yours. It will certainly have mine. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Mr. Justice Stewart 





·'Thank you for your letter concerning my dissenting 
opinion in these cases. I agree that Puyallup II is a point 
of difference between us, although I think that the language 
and history of the treaties are controlling. 
';j, 
The opinion for the Court in Pu*allup II is a scant 
four pages in length and is so cryptic t at it is difficult 
to tell exactly what was being decided or why. Nonetheless, 
I think that the most sensible interpretation of Justice 
Douglas' opinion does not in any way require that the federai 
courts allocate all of the fish subject to the 1854-1855 
treaties between the Indians and the non-Indians. Puyallup 
II involved the State's ban on net fishing for steelhead 
trout in one river (the Puyallup), a regulation 
unquestionably justified by conservation requirements 
described in Puyallup I. The only question presented and 
considered was whether this ban was invalid because it 
violated the "equal protection (requirement] implicit in the 
phrase 'in common with.'" Puyallup I, 391 u.s., at 403. 
Although the ban was neutral on its face, as applied it 
discriminated against the Indians, because members of the 
Puyallup Tribe engaged in fishing only by means of nets. 
Thus, when the Washington Supreme Court ruled that net 
fishing would be ~!lowed only if hook-and-line fishing did 
not take all of the permissibly harvestable fish, the 
Solicitor ~eneral concluded that this would nsubordinat[e} 
the Tribe's riqhts to those of sports fishermen and giv[e] 
the Tribe only what might be left after the sports fishermen 
of unlimited number have had their take." Brief of 
Respondent in Puyallup II, O.T. 1972, No. 481, p.18. In sum, 
it appears that under tfie special circumstances of the 








- ., . 
fishing in effect preferred non-Indian fishing to Indian 
fishing. 
It is plain · from the opinion that the Court 
understood the issue in Puyallup II to be whether the 
2. 
treaties would permit the State to meet conservation goals by 
means of regulations that would burden only Indian fishermen, 
and therefore operate discriminatorily. Writing for the 
Court, . Justice Doug las stated that "[w] hether [the ban on all 
net fishing in the Puyallup River] .- amounts to discrimination 
under the Treaty is the central issue in these cases." Id., . 
at 47. In its brief analysis, the Court observed that "Ttfhe . 
ban on all net fishing in thi Puyallup River for steelhead 
(trout] grants, in effect the entire run to the sports 
fishermen," id., at 46-47, and that the ban discriminated 
against the Indians "because all Indian net fishing is barred 
and only hook-and-line fishing entirely pre-empted by non-
Indians, is allowed." Id., at 48 (emphasis added).------- -
I believe the correct interpretation of Puyallup II, 
therefore, is that it forbad the State of Washington to adopt 
otherwise valid conservation restrictions upon Indian fishing 
if those restrictions . would have the effect of placing the 
entire cost of conservation on the Indians. To be sure, as 
you suggest, the Indians in Puyallup II could have begun 
hook-and-line fishing in order to continue to take fish in 
the Puyallup River. , But the Court in effect ruled that the 
"equal protection" aspect of the treaties would be violated 
if the Indians alone were made to alter their methods of 
taking fish. It was in this' quite limited and unusual 
context that the C6urt suggested apportionment as the method 
by which Indian fishfng rights could best be secured in the 
Puyallup River. The opinion does not suggest ~ that 
apportionment is the Indians' right with respect to all of 
the fish covered by the treaties in the State of Washington. 
. In sum, I understand Puyallup II to require even-
handed treatment of the Indians whenever some limitation on 
their catch is required by conservation concerns. Whether 
this "equal protection" interpretation of the treaties is 
appropriate, and if so whether it applies to all fisheries 
covered by the treaties--or indeed whether it applies 
anywhere in the absence of discriminatory effect, are 












But these questi6ns are before us in 
in the focused sense in whirih the single 















JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~ttpr-tlttt <!j:omt cf Hr~ ~ttitth ~fld~g 
.. a.trlfinghttt. ~. <!]:. 2.(1~~$ 
June 15, 1979 
RE: 77-983, 78-119 and 78-139 - Washington v. Fishing 
Vessel Association 
Dear Lewis: 
Because your "dissenting" opinion probably has as 
good a chance of becoming a Court opinion as my memo-
randum, it may be appropriate for me to respond by letter 
rather than by circulating revisions in my earlier draft. 
I think it is imperative that we focus on the proper 
interpretation of Puyallup II. 
In that case, there was nothing about the state 
regulation that entirely preempted the supply of 
steelhead for non-Indians; as the State vigorously 
argued in that case, Indians and non-Indians were 
afforded equal "access" to the hook-and-line fishery 
authorized by the regulation. Instead, the preemption 
found by the Court was the consequence of the fact that 
non-Indians so thoroughly outnumbered Indians that 
"equal access" effectively prevented the latter from 
taking any appreciable number of fish. By finding that 
preemption inconsistent with the treaties, the Cour_t __ _ 
rather clearly held that the Indians not only have a right 
of "access" to fishing areas but also have a "right Of 
taking" a substantial number of fish. 
Accordingly, if the treaties merely gave the Indians 
the two rights you describe in the last paragraph of your 
opinion, Puyallup II should have been decided the other 
way. For the state regulation was not merely "facially 
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neutral," but it was also substantively neutral because 
it banned commercial, and allowed hook-and-line, fishing 
by both non-Indians and Indians. As I read your opinion, 
the only way you can find that the regulation in Puyallup II 
discriminated against the Indians is to assume that the 
Indians have some kind of inherent right to engage in a 
commercial fishing enterprise that non-Indians do not have 
and to conclude that requiring Indians to observe the 
same rules as non-Indians is therefore somehow "discriminatory." 
Apart from the fact that this theory is inconsistent with 
your earlier interpretation of the treaties at p. 2 as 
affording Indians and non-Indians "precisely the same right 
to fish," I know of no evidence that supports it. As I 
see it, the "discrimination" disapproved of in Puyallup II 
was precisely the same as is involved in this case--under 
preexisting policies, non-Indians could, but Indians could 
not, take substantial numbers of fish. 
I sympathize with your concern about this case, but it 
seems to me we must either overrule Pu'yall'l1p II or give the 
Indians a share of the fish. 
Respectfully, 
fL-
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART June 15, 1979 
Re: 78-119 - Washington v. United States, etc. 
Dear Lewis: 
Please add my name to your dissenting 
opinion in these cases. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
e 
~ltpr.-m.c ~ourt cf tlrt 'Jl!nittb ~tatts 
~asirmgtcn. gl. ~· 2ll~,~~ 
June 15, 1979 
Re: Nos. 77-983, 78-ll9 & 78-139 - Washington fish cases 
Dear John, 
I agree with you that, whether sound or not, our prior cases 
construing the relevant Indian treaties conclude that the Indians not 
only were guaranteed a right of access and a right to fish in their 
accustomed places, but also were assured that the white man would 
not prevent fish from arriving in those places and that some portion 
of those fish would be reserved for them. To some lesser or greater 
extent, I understand that Lewis is to the contrary and hence, to me, 
he would at least partially overrule some of our prior cases. I am 
unprepared to do that, at least without reargument. 
At Conference I was uncertain that a 50-50, or a mere 50-50 
allocation was mandated by the treaties; and although Puyallup III at 
least tacitly held that the steelhead allocation was not inconsistent 
with the treaties, you clearly recognize that none of our cases has 
predetermined a precise allocation of the salmon runs, except, of 
course, for the fish that must escape for conservation purposes. 
After all, the words "in common" cannot possibly have meant a 50-
50 division between the contracting parties in each of the various 
treaties negotiated and executed with particular Indian tribes. 
Although I have difficulty accepting the notion that the treaties 
guaranteed to the Indians, or to a single Indian if he was the only 
Indian fisherman, 50% of the commercial salmon harvest in perpetuity, 
I also have difficulty in arriving at a principal basis for reserving to 
the Indians any lesser share of the harvest, over and above the fish 
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needed for ceremonial and subsistence purposes. The latter portion, 
I take it, small as it likely is, no one would quibble about. If the 
tribe, or any Indian fisherman, claimed enough fish to feed the tribe, 
free or for pay, such a claim would have priority, I suppose. But 
this would seem to be a drop in the bucket and would very likely be 
satisfied by merely a right of access and a right to fish commercially 
in the accustomed places. Indeed, the argument against you seems 
to be that whatever share the Indians are entitled to, given access, 
license-free fishing, and an ability to fish, which many of them ob-
viously have, that share is no more than they are capable of taking 
when they fish in the customary places but "in common" with non-
Indians who are also fishing there. 
It should also be recalled that the tribal members may fish 
in the customary spots in unlimited numbers, as long as there is the 
required escapement. They also may fish, if licensed, in areas other 
than the treaty areas, including the ocean fisheries controlled by the 
United States; and in these other areas they may not only take fish 
that are destined for treaty fishing areas but also those fish (over 
half of the case area salmon, you suggest) that will not enter any of 
the customary Indian fishing locations. 
As you can see, I am somewhat up in the air. However, if the 
case is not to be reargued and I must choose between your draft and 
Lewis' dissent, I would join in making your opinion an opinion for the 
Court. Of course, if reargued I might still come out that way. My 
first choice is to set the case for reargument, although I could under-
stand that a majority mig·ht well believe that we shall learn little more 
than we do not already know. Even so, the issues might mature in 
our own minds, given a little more time and thought. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.®Ullrttttt <!Jtru.rltrf tltt ~tti!th .®tabs 
~a£r.lrhtgfun. ~. tg. 2llc?'~.;l 
June 18, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 77-983, 78-119, and 78-139 - ~.Vashington 
v. Fishing Vessel Association 
In order to emphasize the point that I propose 
that "reasonable livelihood needs"--rather than the 50% 
ceiling--should provide the primary standard for · 
measuring the Indians' share of the fish, I would 
like to substitute the attached pages 11, 26, 27, and 
28 of my original memorandum. 
It seems to me the point is of sufficient 
importance to merit study before we decide whether 




77-!JE.;3, 78-119 & 7S-130-~IE1\l0 
W.\.SHlXGTO~ 11 . FISIIl~G YESSEL ASSN. -·u 
·or to their needs. whichevrr was kss. The Department of 
Fisheries agreed that the Indians were entitled to rra fair and 
equitable share" stat~cl in terms of a percentage of the har-
vestablc salmon in the area; ultimately it proposed a share 
of 11 one-third . :~ . 
Only the Game Departmc'nt thought the treaties providea 
no assurancr to the I nclians that they could take some portion 
·of each run of fish. That agency instrad argued that the 
treati<>s gave the Indians no fishing rights not enjoyed by non-
treaty fishermen rxcept the two rights previously recognizea 
by decisions of this Court-the right of access over private 
lands to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds, see 
Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 240 U. S. 194, United 
States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371. and an exemption from the 
pay.tnent of license fees. Sec Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 
'681. 
The District Court agreecl with the parties who advocated 
an allocation to the Indians, and it essentially agreec.l with the 
United States as to \vhat that allocation should be. It held 
that the Indians are entitled to a 457c to 507'o share of the 
harvcstable fish that \vill at some point pass through n'cog-· 
nized tribal fishing grounds in the caf;e area. (?oiiglliHeantly, 
@"PI' hnlf pf the=-rula.dwmpps Gsh 'll tlw C:li!Q RHHi ''"' uot pll'i:il 
thr01:1gh sueh grounds :.~.nd ~u·Q €'>·cmpt from the orclnr) The 
share was to be calculated on a river-by-river, run-by-run 
basis, subject to certain adjustments. Fish caught by Indians 
for ccr<'monial and subsistrnce purpos<'s as well as fish caught 
within a reservation were <'Xcluded from the calculation of" 
the trib<.'s' share.!G Ill addition, in order to compensate for 
fish caught outside of the case area, i. e., beyond the State's 
portion of the PugP! Souncl \\':tlrr,Jwd, the watrr~lwcl,- of thr Ol~·mpic 
Prninsula north of the Gra~·~ llarhor \rtl!C'r"ht>d, Hild the offshore waters 
adjacC'nt to tho:;:e arra"." :3R-4 F. , upp ., at 328. 
10 l\Iorrovrr, fi,;h raught. b~· indi\'idunl Indian~ at off-rrsNvat ion loca-
tions thn.t. aro not '·u ~unl and :trc·u:-;tomrd" "ite,;, was trc•ated as if it had · 
been caught. by non treaty fbhrmwn. :3~4 F. SUJlJl., at 410. 
, II-
77-983, 78-119 and 78-1.39 -Washington v. Fish4ng Vesse, Assn. 
Insert 
15A/The Sol.icitor General estimates that over half of the 
anadromous fish in the case area do not pass through such 
grounds and a r e exempt from the orde~ Brief for the Un4ted 
States, at 72-73. This estimate 4s cons4stent with the State's 
figures on the number of salmon caught in 1977, see JA 635-63q, 
which indicate that the Indians caught only about 1.8% of the 
fish taken in the case area that year. Of course, the Indians 
claim that they were prevented from catching as many fish that 
year as they were entitled to under the District ~ourt's order 
because of interference by non-Indian fishermen, but even if 
the 18% figure were increased by the amount of fish the Indians 
claim they should have caught, see Brief of Respondent Indian 
Tribes, at 72, n. 273, the Indians' take would on1v amount to 
about 20% of the total number of fish taken in the- case area. 
'J;'he State and the commercial fishing associ.ations no not 
directly dispute either the Sol ici_tor Genera, 's estimate Of:' the 
Indians' representations concernjng the number of fish they 
should have caught under the D4strict rourt's order. 
Nonetheless, they do repeatedly refer to the District_ ~ourt's 
order as awarding half or more of the fish taken in the case 
area to the Indjans. According1.y, a factua, c1ispute exists on 
the question of what percentage of the fish in the case area 
actually pass through Indian fish4ng areas and are therefore 
subject to the Distl':'{ct Court's allocations an~, in the absence , 
of any relevant findings by the courts below, we are unable to · 
express any view on the matter. 
- 1/A .. 
c 
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~-.s---......;I;..:.t;.;.H;.;.Ii.;.;.ar_,s..,·' livelihood needs would be met. Arizo11a v. Califor-
uia, supra, 37a lJ. S., at 600; Winters, supra.. Sec Winans, 
supra, 198 U. S., at 384. This is precisely what the District 
Court did hPn·. excppt that it realized that some ceiling should 
be plac('d on tht• Indians' apportionment to prevent their 
Jlcrds from exhausting the crttire resourcP and thereby frus-
tt·ating tlw trca ty right of ''all other citizens of the territory." 
Thus, it first concluded that at the time the treaties wore 
signed. the Indians, who comprised three-fourths of the terri-
torial population, deprndPd heavily on anadromous fish as a 
source of food, commerce. and cultural cohesion. Indeed, it 
found that the non - lrJdian population depPnded on lmlians. to 
catch the fish that the fonnt•r consumed. See pp. 4-9. and n. 
8, supra. Ouly then did it determine that the l ndian 's pres-
ent-clay subsistenc(' and commercial needs should be met, sub-
ject, of course, to the 50~ ceiling. 26 384 F. Supp., at 342-
343. 
<!/It must be remembered, however, that the 50% figu~e imposes 
a maximum but not a minimum a11ocation. As in Arizona v. 
California and its predecessor cases, the central principle 
here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural resource 
that once was thoroughly and exc~usive1y explo5ted by the 
Indians secures so much as, but not more than, is necessary to 
provide the Indians with a livelihood--that is to say, a 
moderate living. Accordingly, while the maximum possible 
allocation to the Indi.ans is fixed at 50%,l§/ the minimum is 
not; the latter will_, upon proper submissions to the District 
Court, be modified in response to changing ci~cumstances. If, 
for example, a tribe should dwindle to iust a few membets, o~ 
if it should find other sources of support that lea~ it to 
abandon its fisheries, a 45 or 50% all.ocation of an entire run 
that passes through its customary fjshing g~ounds would be ~ 
manifestly inappropriate because the livelihood of the tr~6e 
under those circumstances could not reasonably require an 
allotment of large numbers of fish. 
~bJ I . 
~Tfie-1oglC of the District Court's 507r ceiling is a so mam-
fest. For an equal division-especially between parties who 
presumptively treated \\'ith each other as equals-is suggested, 
if not necessarily dictated, by the word "common" as it ap-
pears in the treaties. Since the days of Solomon, such a divi-
sion has been accepted as a fair apportionment of a common 
as et, aml A11glo-Ameriean common law has presumed that 
division when, as here•. no other percentage is suggestrd by 
the language of the agreement or the surrounding circum-
stances. E. g., 2 American Law~f Property ~ 6.5 ~ 19 (A. 
. ... 
11-0R3, 78-110 & 78-109-1\IEMO 
WASllf1\CTOX v. FISITII\G VESSEL ASSN. 2'i' 
Casner eel. 19.52); E. Hopkins, Handbook on the Law of Real 
Property ~ 200, at 336 ( 1R9G). 
Although the District Court's exercise of its discretion, as 
slightly modified by the Court of Appeals, see n. 17, supra, 
is in most respects unobjectionable, I am not satisfied that 
all of the adjustments it made to its division are consistent 
with the preceding analysis. 
The District Court determined that the fish taken by the 
Indians on their reservations should not be counted against 
their share. It based this determination on the fact that In-
dians have the exclusive right under the treaties to fish on 
their reservations. But this fact seems to me to have no 
greater significance than the f~~ct that some nontreaty fisher-
men may have exclusive access to fishing sites that are not 
11usual and accustomed" places. Shares in the fish runs 
should not be affected by the place where the fish are taken. 
Cf. Puyallup Ill, 433 U. S., at 173-177.27 J therefore dis" 
agree with the District Court's exclusion of the Indians' on-
reservation catch from their portion of the runs. 28 
This same rationale, however, validates the Court-of- \ 
Appea.ls-modified equitable adjustment for fish caught out-
side the jurisdiction of the State by nontreaty fishermen from 
27 Thi;: Court 'o drr·i .:on in Puyallup I 11, which approvrd ~tntr rrgula-
tion of on-rcsrrvation fi~hing m the iutcrc::;t of con~<:>rvation, was issu<:>d 
after the District Court. rxcluclC'd the Indians' on-resC'rvntion take aud the 
Court of App<'ais affirnl('cl. See 520 F. 2d, at 690. There is snb"tantial 
doubt in my mind that. tho~c <·ourts would have decided the question as 
they did had Puyallup I 11 been on the book~. 
2 ~ A likr n'asonillg r<:>quirr~ thr fi:<h taken by trrat~· fi:;hermC'n off of 
the rc~ervation;; and at. location:; othrr than "u:;nal and accustomed" sites, 
sec n. 16, supra, to be count<>d a· part of th<:> Indian~ share. Of cour::e, 
the District Court, in it;; discrC'tion, mn~· detPrmine that so few fish fit into 
this, or any othrr, category (e . g., '·take-home" fi~h caught by non-treaty 
commrrcial fi,:lwrnwn for pcr:.:onal u~e) that, accounting for them incli,·icl-
ually is unnecC':;:;ary, and that an r,:timat<:>d figure may be relied 011 in 
making the annual comput:1tion. Jndrrd, if th<:> amount is truly de 
minimis, no a(.•cotmting at all may be required. 
77-983, 78-110 & 7S-1aO-l\IE:\IO 
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the State of Washillgton. Seen. 17, supra, and accompanying 
text. f'o long as they take fish from identifiable ru11s that 
are destinrcl for traditional tribal fishing grounds, such persons 
may not rely on the location of their take to justify excluding 
it from the1r shan•. Although it is true that the fish involved 
are caught in \\'atcrs subject to the j.urisdiction of the 'Gnitcd 
States, rather than of tlw State, sec 16 C. S. C. ~ 1811-1812, 
the pen:o1is catching them arc nonetheless "citizens of the 
territory" and as such the ueneficiaries of the Indians' recip-
rocal grant of land in tlw tr aties as well as the person's ex-
pressly named in the treaties as sharing fishing rights \vith the 
IndiallS. Accordingly. they may justifiably be treated differ-
ently from nonkcaty fishermen who are not citizens of 
Washington. The statutory provisions just cited are there-
fore important in this context only because they clearly place 
a responsibility on the United States, rather than the State, to 
police the take of fish ill the relevant waters by \Vashington 
citizens insofar as is necessary to assure compliance with the 
treaties. 
On the other hand, as loug as there are enough fish to satisfy 
the Indians' ceremonial and subsistence needs, I see no justifi-
cation for the District Court's exclusion from the treaty share 
of fish caught for these purposes. We need not now decide 
whether priority for such uses would be required in a. period 
of short supply in order to carry out the purposes of the 
treaty. See 384 F. Supp., at 343. For present purposes, I 
would merely hold that the total catch-rather than the 
com1 wrcial catch-is the measure of each party's right.~0 
21' The Govcrnnwni ,;uggc~ t::; that th<' D1st nct Comt',; rxclu~ion of the 
"takc-homr" catch of nontrraty fislH'rmcn from the nontreaty share 
makes up for any losses to tho~e fi shc·rmen occasioned by the exclusion 
of the Indians' cercmomal and sub>'i~tcnc<' take. I sec nothing in the 
District. Court.'s findings to verify th1::; all<'gntiOn, see 38<1 F. Supp., at 343, 
nthough the Di,;trict Court mny WISh to nddrcs::; the is"ue in thi:; light on 
remand. 
Although therr· is SOlll<' dis<·ussion in the briefs conrrming whrthcr th() 
Accordjng:ly, any fish (1. ) taken in Nashington waten> or in 
United States waters off the coast of washington an~ r~\ ta~en 
from runs of fish that pass through the In~ians' usua1 an~ 
accustomed fishing grounds and (3) taken by either memhe~s of 
the Indian tr~bes that are parties to this 1itigation, on the 
one hand, or by non-Indian citizens of Nashington, on the other 
hand, shall count against that party's respective share of the 
fish. 
CHAMI!IE:R8 01'" 
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- Washington v. Washington State Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n. 
- Washington v. U.S. 
- Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n. v. 
USDC for the Western District of Wash. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
John has done a "noble" job but I suspect he would 
agree that his approach is really an "arbitration" 
holding. Developing a principled basis for decision here 
is extremely difficult. 
I do not know whether time will help, but I join 
Byron in opting for a re-argument. 
Regards, 
/ 
;§u:p:uuu <!Jonrlllf tlrt ~lt ~tlrl:ti\' 
~M.!p:ngitttt.l9. <!J. 2.0,?~~ 
C HA MBE R S O F 
JUST ICE J OHN PAUL S T E V E NS 
June 18, 1979 
RE: 77-983, 78-119, 78-139 - Washington v. Fishing 
Vessel Association 
Dear Chief: 
Would it not be appropriate to have a Conference 
discussion of this case before voting on Byron's 
reargument suggestion? 
I appreciate your compliment on my "noble" 
effort, but I am rather surprised by your comment 
that my memorandum proposes an "arbitration" holding. 
Respectfully, 
fk 
The Chief Justice 













JUSTICE JOHN PAUL S T EVEN S 
.:§u:vunu <.!JLllttlllf tqt ~llnittb' .®faltg , 
~ru¥lfinghttt, ~. <.!J. 20~'!$ 
June 18, 1979 
Re: 77-983, 78-119, and 78-139 - Washington v. 
Fishing Vessel Association 
Dear Byron: 
I 
Thank you for your thoughtful letter of June 15th. 
As you suggest, there are no easy answers to the problems 
raised by this case and especially to the question of 
what share of fish the treaties, as interpreted by our 
prior cases, afford the Indians. Nonetheless, it may be 
useful to make a few comments on some of the points you 
have made in your letter. 
First, I should emphasize that I did not intend in 
my memorandum to assure the Indians 50% of the fish in 
perpetuity~ the 50% figure was merely intended to establish 
the ~xtmum amount that the Indians could take if their 
"livelihood needs" reasonably justify that amount. If, as 
you hypothesize, a tribe should dwindle to just one member, 
or only a handful, a 50% allocation of an entire run would 
be manifestly inappropriate because the livelihood of a 
small group of persons could not reasonably require an 
allotment of millions of fish. 
Second, I really think it is clear that the "access" 
approach that Lewis advocates--even if supplemented by the 
fish the Indians catch outside of the treaty areas--would 
not assure the Indians an amount of fish consistent with 
the intent of the treaties. As I understand the figures, 
the access approach would not even satisfy the Indians' 
subsistence and ceremonial needs. Before the District 
Court's decree went into effect, the Indians were catching 




whereas the Diitrict Court found that their subsistence 
and ceremonial needs in later years required about 5% 
(see J.A. 593). More importantly, merely satisfying 
ceremonial and subsistence needs can hardly be the proper 
allocation because the findings make it clear that the 
Indians did have an established trade and commerce in fish 
in the 1850's. 
The fact that the Indians had a virtual monopoly of 
the fisheries when the treaties were made makes the 
analogy to the water cases relevant. You will recall that 
Arizona v. California and other cases hold that Indian 
treaty rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly 
and exclusively exploited by the Indians should secure 
enough of that resource to provide the Indians with a liveli-
hood--that is to say, a moderate living. I should think a 
similar approach is proper with respect to fish, modified 
only by the fact that we impose an absolute ceiling of 50% 
on the Indians' allocation of fish whereas I don't recall 
that anx such ceiling was imposed in any of the water cas.es. 
I have mixed feelings about your suggestion that the 
case should be reargued. Certainly I would agree that the 
case is much too important to let the investment we have 
made this Term be decisive. On the other hand, I am not 
sure we will get much more help on the allocation problem 
than is already available in the hundreds of pages of briefs 
\
that have already been filed. The new question that we might 
suggest for reargument is whether or not P~allup II should 
b~ overruled. I have thought a good deal ~out that sugg~stio~ / 
s1nce we talked about the case the other day, but wonder 1f "' ' 
it would be wise for the Court to advance that suggestion 
when none of the parties and none of the amicus briefs shed 
any doubt on the validity of the case. It seems to me it 
would be quite awkward for the Court to be expressing doubt 
about such an imt ortant case so shortly after it was decided. 
Alffiougfi I have a d ser i ous doubts about whether the case 
was correctly decided--particularly when I was working on 
Puyallup III--I really am persuaded now that the Court did 
reach the correct result there and almost certainly would 
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As an alternative to your reargument suggestion, I 
wonder if it might be useful to try and schedule another 
conference devoted specifically to this case and nothing 
else to see if there is some modified position that could 
command a court. After all, my assignment was merely to 
prepare a memorandum. for further consideration and dis-
cussion by the Court and we really have not had any such 
collegial review of the case since my memorandum was circu-
lated. 
In all events, I appreciate your careful study of the 
case. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
June 18, 1979 
77-983,78-119 78-139 
Dear John: 
As a sideline observer, though not entirely a 
disinterested one, I have read with interest the exchange 
between you and Byron. 
Having had my "say", I do not intend to get into 
the middle of this friendly debate, but I will address one 
point. In your letter of June 18, you identify as perhaps 
the only question open for reargument is "whether or not 
Puyallup II should be overruled". You also say that "it 
would be quite awkward for the Court to be expressing doubt 
about such an important case so shortly after it 
decided" .• 
. ~ 
While I cheerfully recognize that you and I read 
Puyallup II differently, I do suggest - for reasons stated in 
pr1or correspondence and in my dissent - that reasonable 
lawyers and judges may conclude that Puyallup II is not 
nearly so broad a decision as you view 1t. Normally, a case 
may be construed to hold only what was necessary for the 
judgment on the issue presented. No general question of 
apportionment was before the Court in Puyallup II. While the 
language could be construed more broadly, tfie fact is that 
the case turned on the discriminatory effect of a state 
regulation as applied only to the facts before the Court. ; 
A reargument could address, as one question, the 
scope of the holding in Puyallup II. But if we have a 
reargument, as suggested by the Chief Justice and Byron, 
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To: The Chief J,stioe 
Hr. Juetic t. JJr..;nnan 
o''' 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Yr. Just1oe lbite 
"~ .. ~ Mr. Ju.etloe l«arshall 
\)1,., , Mr. Just toe ~la.olatl•m 
Ur. Just t~~.$ RoghnQ ni st 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. .Jut1oe Powell 
?rt~ ct.l'olllaM4: .__,. ___ _ 
lstfpRAFT ~1 S JUN 1979 
·suPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 77- 983, 78---119, AND 78---139 
State of Washington et al., 
Petitioners, 
77-983 v. 
Washington State Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Association et al. 
State of Washington et al., 
Petitioners, 
78-119 v. 
United States et al. 
Puget Sound Gillnetters 
Association et al., 
Petitioners, 
78- 139 v. 
United States District Court 
for the Western District of 
Washington (United States 
et al. , Real Parties in 
Interest). 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Wash-
ington. 
On Writs of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. 
[June -, 1979'] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART \ 
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
I join Parts I-III of the Court's opinion. I am not in agree-
ment, however, with the Court's interpretation of the treaties 
negotiated in 1854 and 1855 with the Indians of the Wash-
ington Territory. The Court's opinion, as I read it, construes 
the treaties' provision "to take fish ... in common" as guaran-
teeing the Indians a specified percentage of the runs of the 
anadromous fish passing land upon which the Indians tradi· 
77-983, 78-119, & 7R-139-DISSENT 
2 WASHINGTO:N v. FISHING VESSEL ASSN. 
tionally have fished. Indeed, it takes as a starting point for 
determining fishing rights an equal division of these fish be-
tween Indians and non-Indians. Ante, at 25 et seq. As I do 
not believe that the language and history of the treaties can 
be construed to support the Court's interpretation, I dissent. 
I 
At issue in these cases is the meaning of language found in 
six similar Indian treaties negotiated and signed in 1854 and 
1855.1 Each of the treaties provides substantially that "[t]he 
right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations is further secured to said Indians, in common with all 
citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for 
the purpose of curing." 2 The question before us is whether 
this "common" fishing right is a right only of access to usual I 
and accustomed fishing sites for the purpose of fishing there, 
or includes the greater right to exclude others from taking a 
particular portion of thE' fish that pass through the sites. As 
thE' Court observes, at the time the treaties were signed there 
was no need to address this question, for thE' surfeit of fish I 
made lack of access to fishing areas the only constraint upon 
supply. Nonetheless. I believe that the compelling inference 
to be drawn from the language and history of the treaties is 
that the Indians sought and retained only the right to go to 
their accustomed fishing places and there to fish along with 
non-Indians. In addition. the Indians retained the exclusive 
right to take fish on their reservations. a right not involved in 
this litigation. In short, they have a right of access to fish. 
1 Treaty of ME>dicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 
Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933; Trf'aty with the 
Makahs. 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty of 
Olympia, 12 Stat. 971. 
2 Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra, at 1133. TherE' werE' some ~light, 
immat.f'rial variations in the language used. See, e. g., Treaty with the 
Yakimas, quoted infra, at 3. \ 
77- 983, 78-119, & 78-139-DISSENT 
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Nothing in the language of the treaties indicates that any 
party understood that constraints would be placed on the 
amount of fish that anyone could take, or that the Indians 
would be guaranteed a percentage of the catch. Quite to 
the contrary, the language confers upon non-Indians precisely 
the same right to fish that it confers upon Indians, even in 
those areas where the Indians traditionally had fished. 
United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371 ( 1905). As it cannot 
be argu~d that Congress intended to guarantee non-Indians 
any spe~ified percentage of the available fish , there is neither 
force n~r logic to the argument that the same language-
the "right to take fish"-does guarantee such a percentage to 
Indians.; 
This conclusion is confirmed by the lanaguage used in the 
treaty 1egotiated with the Yakima Tribe, which explicitly 
inch·des what apparently is implicit in each of the treaties: 
the Indians' right to take fish on their reservations is exclu-
sive. Thus, the Yakima treaty provides that "[t]he exclusive 
right of! taking fish in all the streams where running through 
or bord! ring said reservation, is further secured to said con-
federated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right of 
taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common 
with citizf'ns of the Territory .... " 12 Stat. 951. See ante, 
at --. i There is no reason apparent from the language used 
in the treaties why the "right of taking fish" should mean one 
thing for purposes of the exclusive right of reservation fishing 
and quite another for purposes of the "common" right of fish-
ing at usual and accustomed places. Since the Court inter-
prets the right of taking fish in common to be an entitlement 
to half bf the entire catch taken from fisheries passing the In-
dians' traditional fishing grounds, it therefore should follow 
that th~ Court would interpret the exclusive right of taking 
fish to be an entitlement to all of the fish taken from fisheries 
passing the Indian 's reservations. But the Court apparently 
concedes. that this exclusive right is not of such draconian. 
·. 
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proportions. Indeed, the Court would reduce the Indians' 
50% portion by those fish caught on the reservation. The 
more reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that when the Indians 
and Governor Stevens agreed upon a "right of taking fish," 
they understood this right to be one of access to fish-exclusive 
access with respect to fishing places on the reservation, a11d 
common a.ccess with respect to fishing places off of the 
reservation.8 
In addition to the language of the treaties, the historical 
setting in which they were negotiated supports the inference 
that the fishing rights secured for the Indians were rights of 
access alone. The primary purpose of the six treaties nego-
tiated by Governor Stevens was to resolve growing disputes 
between the settlers claiming title to land in the Washington 
Territor:y under the Land Donation Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 437, 
and the Indians who had occupied the land for generations. 
Under tpe bargain struck in the treaties, the Indians ceded 
their claims to vast tracts of land, retaining only certain spec-
ified areas as reservations, where they would have exclusive 
rights o~ possession and use. In exchange, the Indian tribes 
were given substantial sums of money aud were promised 
various forms of aid. See, e. g., Treaty of Medicine Creek, 
10 Stat. 1132. By thus separating the Indians from the set-
tlers it was hoped that friction could be minimized. 
The negotiators apparently realized, however, that restrict-
ing the lndians to relatively small tracts of land might inter-
fere with their securing food. See Letter of George Gibbs 
to Captain McClellan, App. 326 ("[the Indians] require the 
3 Indeed, if the Court's interprE'tation of the treatiE's were correct, then 
the exclusive right with respect to rE'scrvation fi;;hing would be largely 
superfluous. If thE' Indians had the right to 50%, and no more, of the 
fish irrespective of where the~' are caught, then it hardly would be of any 
great valuE' to them that they could keep others from taking fish from 
locations on the reservation. The mo. t reasonable way to interpret the 
exclusive right of reservation fishing so that it was of value, therefore, is 
as a special right of access. 
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liberty of motion for the purpose of seeking, in their proper 
season, roots, berries, and fish"). This necessary "liberty of 
motion" was jeopardized by the title claims of the settlers 
whose land abutted-or would abut-the waterways from 
which fish traditionally had been caught. Thus, in Governor 
Stevens' report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he 
noted the tension between the land rights afforded settlers 
under the 1850 Land Donation Act and the Indians' need to 
have some access to the fisheries. Although he expressed the 
view that "[i] t never could have been the intention of Con .. 
gress that Indians should be excluded from their ancient 
fisheries," he noted that "no condition to this effect was in-
serted in the donation act," and therefore recommended the 
question "should be set a.t rest by law." Report of Governor 
Stevens to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, App. 327. 
Viewed within this historical context, the common fishing right 
reserved to the Indians by the trea.ties of 1854 and 1855 could 
only have been the right, over and above their exclusive fish-
ing right on their reservations, to roam off of the reservations 
in order to reach fish at the locations traditionally used by 
the Indians for this purpose. On the other hand, there is no 
historical indication that any of the parties to the treaties 
understood that the Indians would be specifically guaranteed 
some set portion of the fisheries to which they traditionally 
had had access. 
II 
Prior decisions of this Court have prevented the dilution of 
these treaty rights, but none has addressed the issue now be-
fore us. I read these decisions as supporting the interpreta-
tion set forth above. This is particularly true of United 
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) , the case most directly 
relevant. In that case a settler had constructed several fish 
wheels in the Columbia River. These fish wheels were built 
at locations where the Indians traditionally had fished , and 
11 1necessita.te [ d] the exclusive possession of the space occupied 
77- 983, 7s-.119, & 78- 139-DISSENT 
WASHINGTON v. FISHING VESSEL ASSN. 
by the wheels,' " id., at 380, thereby interfering with the 
Indians' treaty right of access to fish. This Court reviewed 
in some detail the precise nature of the Indians' fishing rights 
under the Yakima Treaty, and concluded that the treaties) 
" .. . reserved rights .. . to every individual Indian, as 
though named therein. They imposed a servitude upon 
every piece of land as though described therein. There 
was an exclusive right of fishing reserved within certain 
boundaries. There was a right outside of those bound-
aries reserved 'in common with citizens of the Territory.' 
As a mere right, it was not exclusive in the Indians. Citi-
zens might share it, but the Indians were secured in its 
enjoyment by a special provision of means for its exer-
cise. They were given "the right of taking fish at all usual 
and accustomed places,' and the right 'of erecting tem-
porary buildings for curing them.' The contingency of 
the future ownership of the lands, therefore, was fore-
seen and provided for-in other words, the Indians were 
given a right in the land- the right of crossing it to the 
river-the right to occupy it to the extent and for the 
purpose mentioned. No other conclusion would give 
effect to the treaty." !d. , at 381 (emphasis added). 
The Court thus viewed these treaties as intended to "giv[e] 
a right in the land"-a "servitude' ' upon all non-Indian 
land-to enable Indians to fish "in common with citizens of 
the Territory." The focus was on access to the traditional 
fishing areas for the purpose of enjoying the "right of fish-
ing." !d., at 380. The Winans Court concluded, on the 
facts before it, that the right of access to fish in these areas 
had been abridged. It stated that "in the actual taking of 
fish white men may not be confined to a spear or crude net, 
but it does not follow that they may construct and use a de-
vice which gives them exclusive possession of the fishing 
places, as it is admitted a fish wheel does." I d., at 382 
(emphasis added) . Thus, Winans was decided solely upon 
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the basis of a treaty-secured right of access to fish. Moreover, 
the Court's analysis of the treaty right at issue in Winans 
strongly indicates that nothing more than a right of access 
fairly could be inferred from the treaty.4 
Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the treaties to require 
that any specified proportion of the catch be reserved for In-
dians. Indeed, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of Washing-
ton, 391 U. S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I), consistently with 
Winans, described the right of Indians under the treaties as 
"the right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed places.'" Id., 
at 398." The issue before the Court in Puyallup I was the 
extent to which the State could regulate fishing. It held that, 
" ... the 'right' to fish outside the reservation was a treaty 
'right' tha.t could not be qualified or conditioned by the 
State. But 'the time and manner of fishing ... neces-
sary for the conservation of fish,' not being defined or 
established by the treaty, were within the reach of state 
power." 
4 The Government's brief in Winans , cited approvingly by the Court in 
that case, indicates that the Government also understood the treaty to 
guarantee nothing more than access rights to traditional fishing locations. 
In that brief, the Government advocated only "a way of access, free ingress 
and egress to and from the fishing grounds." Brief for Appellant, No. 180, 
0. T. 1904, p. 56. 
This interpretation of Winans was unequivocally affirmed by the Court 
a short time later in Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 194 
(1919) . At issue in that case was whether Indians from the Yakima 
nation had the right under their treaty to cross the Columbia River and 
fish from the south bank, which admittedly had belonged to other tribes 
at the time of the treaty. The Court viewed Seufert, a case unquestion-
ably involving only the right of access, to be squarely controlled by its 
earlier decision in Winans. 249 U. S., at 198. Moreover, the Court 
reaffirmed its view that the effect of the reservation of common fishing 
rights to the Indian~ amounted to a servitude. !d., at 199. 
5 The treaty right was repeatedly referred to in Puyallup I as a "right 
to fish ." This phrase was used no less than seven times in the course 
of the opinion, with no distinction being made between the right "to fish" 
and the right "to take fish." !d., at 397-99. 
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The Court today finds support for its views in Puyallup I 
because the Court there recognized that. apart from conser-
vation measures, the State could not impose restrictive regula-
tions on the treaty rights of Indians. But it does not follow 
from this that an affirmative right to a specified percentage 
of the catch is guaranteed by the treaties to India11s or to non-
Indians, for the Court misapprehends the nature of the basic 
right sought to be preserved by Congress. This, as noted 
above, was a right of the Indians to reach their usual and ac-
customed fishing areas. Put differently, this right, described 
in Winans as a servitude or right over land not owned by the 
Indians, entitles the Indians to trespass on any land when 
necessary to reach their traditional fishing areas, and is a right 
not enjoyed by non-Indian residents of the area. 
In permitting the State to place limitations on the Indians' 
access rights when conservation so requires. the Court went 
farther in Puyallup I and sugl!ested that even regulations thus 
justified would have to satisfy the requirements of "equal pro-
tection implicit in the phrase 'in common with.' " 391 U. S., 
at 403. Accordingly, in Washington Game Department v. 
Puyallup Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup ll). we con-
sidered whether the conservation measures taken by the State 
had been evenhanded in the treatment of the Indians. At 
issue was a Washington State ban on all net fishing-by both 
Indians and non-Indians-for steelhead trout in the Puyallup 
River. According to testimony before the trial court, the 
annual run of steelhead trout in the Puyallup River was be-
tween 16,000 and 18.000, while unlimited sport fishing would 
result in the taking of between 12,000 and 14,000 steelhead 
annually. Because the escape of at least 25% of the entire 
run was required for hatcheries and spawning, the sport fish-
ing totally pre-empted all commercial fishing by Indians. The 
State therefore imposed a ban on all net fishing. The Indians 
claimed that this ban amounted to an improper subordination 
of their treaty rights to the privilege of recreational fishing 
enjoyed by non-Indians. 
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We held in Puyallup II that the ban on net fishing, as 
it applied to Indians covered by treaty, was an infringement 
of their rights. The State in the name of conservation was 
discriminating against the Indians "because all Indian net 
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely pre-
empted by non-Indians, is allowed." 414 U. S., at 48. 'Be-
cause " [ o] nly an expert could fairly estimate what degree of 
net fishing plus fishing by hook and line would allow the 
escapement of fish necessary for perpetuation of the speciest 
id., at 48, we remanded to the Washington courts for a fair ap-
portionment of the steelhead run between Indian net fishing 
and non-Indian sport fishing. 
Relying upon the reference in Puyallup II to "apportion. 
ment," the Court expansively reads the decision in that case 
as strongly implying, if not holding, that the catch at Indians' 
"accustomed" fishing sites must be apportioned between In-
dian and non-Indian fishermen. This view certainly is not a 
necessary reading of Puyallup II. Indeed, I view it as a 
quite unjustified extension of that case. Puyallup II ad-
dressed an extremely narrow question; where there had been 
"discrimination" by state regulations under which "all Indian 
net .fishing [was] barred and only hook and line fishing en-
tirely pre-empted by non-Indians, fwas] allowed." !d., at 48. 
In any event, to the extent language in Puyallup II may be 
read as supporting some general apportionment of the catch, 
it is dictum that is plainly incompatible with the language and 
historical understanding of these treaties.6 
Emerging from our decisions in Winans, Puyallup I, and 
1 Having decided tlmt some regulation was required, but that the treaty 
forbad the State to choosr to regulate only Indian fishing for conservation 
purposrs, we remanded for an apportionment between net fishing and sport 
fishing. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept ., 433 U.S. 165 (1977) 
(Puyallup III), is of little assistance in deciding the issue in the present 
cases. The Court in that case decided only that the regulations permitted 
in Puyallup I could be applied against Indian fishing on the reservati®&, 
as well as off of them. 
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Puyallup II, therefore, is the proper approach to interpreta--
tion of the Indians' common fishing rights at the present 
time, when demand outstrips supply. The Indians have the 
right to go to their traditional fishing grounds to fish. Once 
there, they cannot be restricted in their methods or in the 
size of their take, save insofar as restrictions are required for 
conserving the fisheries from which they draw. Even in situa-
tions where such regulations are required, however, the State 
must be evenhanded in limiting Indian and non-Indian fishing 
activity. It is not free to make the determination-appar-
ently made by Washington with respect to the ban on net fish-
ing in the Puyallup River-that Indian fishing rights will be 
totally subordinated to the interests of non-Indians. 
III 
In my view, the District Court below-and now this 
Court-has formulated an apportionment doctrine that can" 
not be squared with the language or history of the treaties, or 
indeed with the prior decisions of this Court. The applica-
tion of this doctrine, and particularly the construction of the 
term "in common" as requiring a basic 50-50 apportionment, 
is likely to result in an extraordinary economic windfall to 
Indian fishermen in the commercial fish market by giving 
them a substantial position in the market wholly protected 
from competition from non-Indian fisherman.7 Indeed, non- f 
7 The Court apparently s£'es this windfall as being necessary alms for 
the Indian~ , for it concludes that "in light of th£' far superior numbers, 
capital rr~ources, and technology of the non-Indians, the concept of the 
Indians' 'equal opportuni ty' to take advantage a scarce resource is likely 
. in practice to mean that the Indians' ' right of taking fish' will net them 
virtually no ca tch at all ." Ante, at 17 n . 21. But if the plight of the 
Indian:-; in the Pacific Northwest requires that special provisi:ms be made 
·for their livelihood, this Court should not £'nact these provisions by 
reforming a barga in ~tru ck more than two hundred years ago. Nor should 
the cost of recompensing the Indians for their past losses fall only on the 
shoulders of the commercial fishermen of the State of Wa::>hington-a very 
small port ion of the people who benefitt ed from the di::;plar r,ment of the 
.• 
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Indian fishermen apparently will be required from time to 
time to stay out of fishing areas completely while Indians 
catch their Court-decreed allotment. In sum, the District 
Court's decision will discriminate quite unfairly against non-
Indians.8 I 
Indians. This is a problem for re,;ulntion b~· Cor.grPss. It has the basic 
responsibility for making ::;ure that Indians are not discriminated against, 
and that tlwir rights arC' fully protected. In the exercise of this re<>pon-
sibility Congress could pnr:sue various avenues for relief of any perceived 
discrimination or disadvantage. It could, for example, provide for Indian 
fishermen the modern technology and capital resources that they lack, 
thereby f'nabling them to compete on an equal basi~; with non-Indian 
fi::;hermen. Moreover, a legislative resolution of this problem can protect 
the interests of Indians without impo::;ing substantially the entire cost upon 
non-Indian fh;hermen of the State of W:~~hington . 
8 In addition to the burdens placed upon non-Indian fi~;hermen, the 
Court'~; decision i::; likely to prove difficult to enforce fairly and effec-
tively. To date, the District Court has had to resort to the outer limits 
of its equitable powers in order to enforce its decree. This has included 
takirg over superdEion of all of the commercial fishing in the Puget 
Sound area, ordering thr creation of a telephone "hot line" that fishermen 
ran u~;e to drtermine when and where they may legally fish, and ordering· 
United States Marshals to board fishing craft and inspect for violations 
of the court's preliminary injunction. Indeed, in his response to the peti-
tion for certiorari in the present case, the Solicitor General set forth in 
some detail the cxtraord;nary difficulty the Government has hnd in en-
forcing the Di;;trict Court's drcr~s, Ra~·ing: 
" ... the default of the state government has required the United States to 
concentrate a disproportionate amount of its limited fisheries enforcement 
persrmnel on what is essentially a local enforcement problem. Agents of 
1he National Marine Fisheries Service, the Unitrd Statrs Fish and Wild-
life Scn•ice, the United States Mar~;ha!s Service, and the Coast Guard 
ha"e lwcn diverted from their regular duties to assist the district court in 
implcmrntmg the Indians' treaty rights. This has resulted in a redurtion 
111 tlw federal fisherie~ services available for the rest of the country and for 
thC' enforcement of the ocean fi~heries programs governed by the Fishery 
Conservation Management Act of 1976." Brief of Respondent on Peti-
tion for Certiorari, at 20. 
The;;e problems, it seem~ to me, will be exacerbated by a formula appor'-
tiomnent StLch as that urdered by th<~ C€1'lll't.. 
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To be sure, if it were necessary to construe the treaties 
to produce these results, it would be our duty so to construe 
them. But for the reasons stated above, I think the Court's 
construction virtually ignores the historical setting and pur-
poses of the treaties, considerations that bear compellingly 
upon a proper reading of their language. Nor do the prior 
decisions of this Court support or justify what seems to me to 
be a substantial reformation of the bargain struck with the 
Indians in 1854- 1855. 
I would hold that the treaties give to the Indians two sig-
nificant rights that should be respected. As made clear in 
Winans, the purpose of the treaties was to assure to Indians 
the right of access over private lands so that they could con-
tinue to fish at their usual and accustomed fishing grounds. 
Indians also have the exclusive right to fish on their reserva-
tions, and are guaranteed enough fish to satisfy their cere-
monial and subsistence needs. Moreover. as subsequently 
construed, the treaties exempt Indians from state regulation 
(including the payment of license fees) except that necessary 
for conservation in the interest of all fishermen. Finally, 
under Puyallup II, it is settled that even a facially neutral 
conservation regulation is invalid if its effect is to discriminate 
against Indian fishermen. These rights, privileges. and ex-
emptions-possessed only by Indians-are quite substantial. 
I find no basis for according them additional advantages. 
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